
CVE-2026-104480 concerns membership in an encrypted voice or video session. An affected libdave client before version 1.2.0 could accept an MLS Welcome message whose resulting roster contained a participant it did not recognise. The attacker precondition is substantial: control of the DAVE signalling path, such as the voice gateway or an equivalent ability to alter the signalling messages a client receives. The record does not describe an ordinary call participant breaking the encryption. That is why the mechanism matters. If a client admits the wrong member, the media can still be encrypted correctly, but for the wrong group. Discord's libdave v1.2.0 release, dated 26 August, restored the stricter validation. The CVE appeared on 2 October, about five weeks later. The public record does not say how many deployed clients still had older code, identify compromised calls or establish exploitation. For anyone embedding libdave, the useful check is the version actually shipped to users, followed by a test that rejects an unexpected group member. An upstream release date alone does not tell you what your clients are running. The roster decision, release timeline and evidence limits: https://www.pk-sharma.com/briefing/discord-libdave-encrypted-call-roster-check-signalling-control #Encryption #ApplicationSecurity #Discord
Post summary
The post discloses CVE-2026-104480 in libdave and identifies Discord's libdave v1.2.0 as the fixed release that restored stricter roster validation, while explicitly noting no established evidence of active exploitation.

