CVE-2026-115693

LOWCVSS 9.1 · CRITICAL

Signal is active with 1 mentions in latest observed window

Immediate actions

  • Track advisory updates for patch or workaround availability

Recommended action window: Monitor and triage in normal cycle

NVD description

Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in hackney_ssl in benoitc hackney allows an on-path attacker to impersonate a server pinned to a private certificate authority via a certificate chain that ends in a publicly trusted root. hackney adds {partial_chain, fun hackney_ssl:partial_chain/1} to every verify_peer configuration. The callback returns any certificate in the peer chain whose public key matches a root in the bundled certifi store as the trust anchor, and OTP honours that callback over the configured cacerts. hackney_ssl:merge_ssl_opts/3 kept the callback when the caller replaced the trust store with cacerts or cacertfile in ssl_options, so a connection pinned to a private CA still accepted any chain that carried a publicly trusted root. The hostname check still applies, so the attacker needs a publicly trusted certificate for the pinned hostname. This issue affects hackney: from 1.24.0 before 4.9.0.

0.0/ 10 priority

Sources & remediation

Weakness type (CWE)
CWE-295

Priority

LOW

Exploitation

NONE

PoC

NONE

Patch

NONE

Momentum

NONE

Threat summary

  • 1 mentions across 1 observed day

What's happening

  • 1 total mentions across 1 day

Deep dive

Activity timeline1 mentions / 1d
00111Mentions · 2026-10-26: 110-26
Referenced assets1 URL
By indicator
Full discourse1 post
  • Eliran Emuna@EmunaEliran

    🚨 Pinned your Erlang/Elixir HTTP client to a private CA? In hackney, that pin could be bypassed (CVE-2026-115693) When cacerts or cacertfile is passed in ssl_options, hackney kept its certifi partial_chain callback, so any chain carrying a publicly trusted root was still accepted. CVSS 4.0: 9.1 (CNA, EEF). ⚠️ Impact: an on-path attacker holding a publicly trusted cert for the pinned hostname can impersonate the server (hostname check still applies) 📦 Affected: hackney 1.24.0 to before 4.9.0 🛡️ Fix: upgrade to 4.9.0. Workaround: pass your own {partial_chain, Fun} alongside cacerts/cacertfile ✅ Default certifi trust store: not affected · Known exploited: not confirmed 🔗 https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-115693.html #CyberSecurity #CVE #Elixir

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