CVE-2026-115892

LOWCVSS 5.7 · MEDIUM

Signal is active with 1 mentions in latest observed window

Immediate actions

  • Track advisory updates for patch or workaround availability

Recommended action window: Monitor and triage in normal cycle

NVD description

Wasmtime is a runtime for WebAssembly. From 46.0.0 until 48.0.7 and 49.0.4, lowering a host-created component-model stream or future into a guest can omit a required payload-type check after the value passes through guest code and returns through StreamAny, FutureAny, Val::Stream, Val::Future, or an equivalent typed reader. A malicious guest that controls exported function types or returned values can cause the host to pass the type-erased value to a guest expecting a different payload type, which panics the Wasmtime host. This issue is fixed in versions 48.0.7 and 49.0.4.

0.0/ 10 priority

Sources & remediation

Weakness type (CWE)
CWE-248CWE-843

Priority

LOW

Exploitation

NONE

PoC

NONE

Patch

NONE

Momentum

NONE

Threat summary

  • 1 mentions across 1 observed day

What's happening

  • 1 total mentions across 1 day

Deep dive

Activity timeline1 mentions / 1d
00111Mentions · 2026-11-05: 111-05
Full discourse1 post
  • David McCabe@da_be19

    The October 2026 advisory cluster (CVE-2026-115889, -115893, -115892) confirms that compiler-level bugs are the primary vector for sandbox escape. CVE-2026-115889 (CVSS 9.9) involves SSA value index overflow in Cranelift, where crafted Wasm functions overflow 24-bit fields, causing type confusion on every architecture. CVE-2026-115893 (CVSS 9.9, AArch64-only) exploits a `br_table` with more than ~256,000 targets compiling to an incorrect conditional branch target, allowing jumps to attacker-controlled offsets. ▸ CVE-2026-115892 (CVSS 5.7, DoS — distinct from the two sandbox escapes): lowering a host-created stream/future into a guest expecting a different payload type can omit the required payload-type check; a guest triggering the mismatch panics the host runtime, a denial of service rather than an escape. ▸ Trap semantics lock down the entire Store upon any fault, complicating recovery and diagnostics. Resource isolation remains underprotected. Malicious instances can exhaust host resources via WASI interfaces, degrading co-located containers (arXiv:2509.11242). Debugging gaps persist as a primary barrier to production adoption. JIT debugging support is in progress, but monitoring resource isolation and managing trap-induced store lockdowns remain critical operational challenges. 5/6

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