🔥 CyberForge CVE of the Day #103
🚨 CVE-2026-118740 — Microsoft Aspire Dashboard authorization bypass
🎯 The quick hit:
What is happening? Microsoft describes missing authorization in Aspire Dashboard. An unauthenticated NotFound route can permit telemetry deletion in both standalone and AppHost-hosted dashboards. A further browser-token exposure consequence applies to standalone deployments using browser-token authentication. Keep that condition attached to the token story.
Who should check? Owners of Dashboard instances selected through SDK packages, a CLI bundle, a custom location or a container. This is a cross-platform Aspire component; Microsoft branding does not make it a Windows-only or general .NET-runtime issue. Check the artifact actually serving the frontend, its access policy and its reachable routes.
What fixes it? The actual Dashboard must be 13.6.5 or later. Microsoft explicitly says 13.6.3 and 13.6.4 are not corrected targets. A project dependency change cannot replace a separately pinned image, CLI-bundled Dashboard or custom binary. A newer .NET runtime or SDK does not by itself update Aspire Dashboard.
Why the urgency? Microsoft's published assessment is network-accessible, PR:N / UI:N, with CVSS v3.1 9.1 Critical. Its separate CVRF product severity is Important. Sensitive Dashboard information and telemetry integrity deserve attention without inventing host RCE, root access or an OTLP/API-key bypass.
Start here: actual Dashboard selection → frontend reachability/authentication mode → exposed interval → available request and independent telemetry history → supported correction → running-state evidence. Assign the AppHost/platform owner and an incident lead when access, deletion or disclosure is suspected.
Escalate when: independent records support unauthorized access or an unexplained telemetry change, or a reachable deployment's artifact cannot be identified. Missing graphs, one unusual request or a login screen alone cannot establish exploitation or safety. Preserve relevant history before a restart removes temporary data, where incident procedures permit.
🔑 Key details:
- Identity: CVE-2026-118740; Microsoft CNA; Aspire Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability.
- Weakness: CWE-862 — Missing Authorization.
- Microsoft numeric assessment: CVSS v3.1 9.1 / Critical. Full published vector: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N/E:U/RL:O/RC:C`.
- Microsoft product rating: Important for the two named CVRF products. Preserve that label beside the numeric classification.
- NVD: Awaiting Analysis; Microsoft Secondary 9.1, base-only vector `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N`. It is not an independent NIST score.
- Reviewed advisory: GHSA-4g86-54fm-h9h8, Critical 9.1, with seven NuGet SDK package rows and broader vendor guidance.
- CNA range: two product rows, 13.6.1 inclusive to 13.6.5 exclusive. The detailed vendor bulletin separately covers standalone Dashboard and seven SDK packages below 13.6.5, without the same lower bound.
- Correction: Dashboard 13.6.5+ through the deployment's actual selection route; 13.6.3/13.6.4 remain affected targets.
- Vendor activity fields: `Publicly Disclosed:No;Exploited:No;Latest Software Release:Exploitation Less Likely`, preserved as dated Microsoft assessments.
- CISA SSVC: exploitation none, automatable no, technical impact partial, timestamp 2026-11-10 19:29:12.
- KEV: exact-ID non-match in catalog 2026.11.10, 1,779 entries; absence does not prove no attacks.
- FIRST EPSS: 0.923%; 60.871st percentile; model date 12th November 2026. Forecast, rank and observed activity are different questions.
The full vector adds E:U/RL:O/RC:C after the base metrics. CVRF carries TemporalScore 7.9 with IsTemporalScoreFieldSpecified false, and EnvironmentalScore 0. Those fields do not establish a separately validated temporal or local environmental assessment. No usable CVSS v4 assessment was established; a null-vector/0.0 placeholder is unavailable, not zero risk.
🧬 What actually went wrong?
The frontend authorization decision must protect alternate routes as well as ordinary pages. Microsoft describes a NotFound path that could reach protected Dashboard UI infrastructure without the intended check. A login screen does not establish authorization on every component.
The fixed release links commit 0b6bfe2f538d4eed8a9ae7e11651c09dbbe886b8, “Fix dashboard not-found authentication.” Its diff changes 35 files, including 11 functional source files, resources and tests; this is a broader authorization change.
Fixed-tag Routes.razor wraps NotFound content in an AuthorizeView using FrontendAuthorizationDefaults.PolicyName before MainLayout. Other changes check authentication before layout, dialog, interaction and standalone terminal initialization. The helper intentionally returns for Unsecured/null frontend mode: the patch does not add authentication to an intentionally anonymous service.
The diff and two files at v13.6.5 were inspected passively. No build, regression, exploit, product request or runtime test ran. Added terminal guards do not establish host/AppHost RCE. Keep deletion in both deployment modes separate from additional token exposure in standalone BrowserToken mode. Frontend, OTLP and telemetry API authentication are separate interfaces; no universal API-key bypass is established.
📦 Which deployments belong in scope?
The CNA names Aspire Dashboard and Aspire.Dashboard.Sdk.linux-x64, each at 13.6.1 ≤ version < 13.6.5. The fuller vendor bulletin/GHSA separately cover standalone Dashboard and seven SDK packages <13.6.5:
- Aspire.Dashboard.Sdk.linux-x64
- Aspire.Dashboard.Sdk.linux-arm64
- Aspire.Dashboard.Sdk.linux-musl-x64
- Aspire.Dashboard.Sdk.osx-x64
- Aspire.Dashboard.Sdk.osx-arm64
- Aspire.Dashboard.Sdk.win-x64
- Aspire.Dashboard.Sdk.win-arm64
Preserve both scopes. The shorter CNA list does not establish safety for older or other vendor-listed artifacts; do not invent a shared lower bound or additional package variants.
SDK/AppHost: check explicit/central http://Aspire.Hosting.AppHost or implicit Aspire.AppHost.Sdk, resolved Dashboard packages and the selected process. The vendor route includes updating, restore/rebuild and AppHost restart.
CLI/custom: identify and update the Dashboard actually selected from that bundle/location. Package-reference changes alone cannot replace it.
Containers: the vendor names `http://mcr.microsoft.com/aspire/dashboard:13.6.5`; replace old/nightly references and recreate/redeploy. Existing generated Compose/Kubernetes manifests need their own image update.
NuGet lists linux-x64 13.6.5, and the MCR fixed tag returns amd64/arm64 manifests. Published metadata is not downloaded-content validation, a local pull or a completed rollout. Include rollback/dormant paths in verification.
🕰️ Exposure window and timeline
- 20th October, 18:01:58: corrective commit timestamp; not public fix availability.
- 10th November: Microsoft advisory context; linux-x64 NuGet registration published 17:13:28. 45+00:00; CVE published 18:24:15; CISA SSVC assessed 19:29:12.
- 10th November, 21:45:33: v13.6.5 release published, draft=false/prerelease=false.
- 11th November: informational CVRF download-link correction; official issue creation differs from the bulletin body's 10th November label.
- 12th November: FIRST model date, reviewed GHSA publication and CVE update.
- 13th November, 09:09:00: source cutoff.
Microsoft credits Weeraphat Srisutham. These dates are not an attack timeline. Choose the local interval from affected runs and actual reachability history. Disclosure need not start exposure; a dependency edit need not end it. Retain run changes, timezones and retention uncertainty.
🗺️ MITRE ATT&CK:
T1190 — Exploit Public-Facing Application is a conditional analyst mapping for exploitation of the authorization boundary through a public-facing Dashboard. Local use remains unassessed. An internal-only instance needs its own reachability assessment; do not call every Dashboard public-facing.
Deletion, token exposure and later use need separate evidence. No complete chain, actor, persistence, host execution or ransomware is asserted. The technique supplies analytical context, not a CVE-specific detector.
🧭 SOC investigation trail:
The objective is to establish applicability and an unauthorized outcome with usable records. The following six cards are proposed checks, not completed findings. Preserve what was collected, the covered interval and gaps. Avoid copying secret-bearing configuration or tokens into public notes.
C01 — Scope
Action: inventory Dashboard selections across AppHost SDK, CLI/custom and standalone container paths. Evidence: resolved packages, manifests, running process/container identity, frontend mode and gateway routes. Signal: an applicable older Dashboard reachable by an untrusted party, or a material provenance gap. Correlate: actual serving artifact with route/configuration and deployment times. Benign: an unused image or stale manifest may never have served. Escalate: confirmed affected reachability, a forgotten direct route or an exposed instance whose build cannot be established.
C02 — Preserve
Action: retain available access/deployment history and independent telemetry before disruptive change, when incident procedures permit. Evidence: approved exports, actual SQLite storage and relevant sidecars under supported acquisition procedures. Signal: unexplained gaps or cleared data during exposure. Correlate: application/run identity, UTC/clock differences, retention/persistence and maintenance records. Benign: temporary database cleanup, run pruning or ordinary record limits. Escalate: deletion or a gap corroborated outside the Dashboard. Do not alter a live database merely to investigate it.
C03 — Hunt
Action: review available request and configuration history for unexplained access, clearing or disclosure leads. Evidence: proxy/WAF, application and retained endpoint/network records where actually collected. Signal: activity inconsistent with authorized use, especially beside independently supported telemetry loss. Correlate: the same instance/run, timing, approved operators and collection health. Benign: authorized cleanup, failed ingestion, a new run or collector outage. Escalate: corroborated unauthorized access/modification. No validated CVE-specific URI, event ID or request signature is supplied.
C04 — Correlate
Action: distinguish a reachable vulnerable path, possible disclosure, actual deletion and later account use. Evidence: independent service/collector copies, identity records and protected configuration history. Signal: a supported unauthorized sequence and consequence. Correlate: affected deployment and interval; retain proxy/NAT uncertainty. Benign: shared development hosts, multiple operators and normal token refresh complicate attribution. Escalate: unauthorized outcome or credible secret-exposure concern. Keep browser-token exposure scoped to standalone BrowserToken deployments; an address is not an identity.
C05 — Remediate
Action: correct the Dashboard actually selected, coordinating preservation and containment with the owner. Evidence: change record, fixed package/image/bundle provenance and rebuilt deployment outputs. Signal: 13.6.5+ for the relevant Dashboard, rather than just a newer .NET installation. Correlate: the update with every serving and dormant path. Benign: a newer AppHost reference can coexist with an older manifest, bundle or custom binary. Escalate: active older instances, rollout failure or no supported update route. Neither 13.6.3 nor 13.6.4 is a fixed target.
C06 — Verify
Action: obtain evidence of the running corrected Dashboard and intended access policy. Evidence: selected artifact, deployment/runtime identity, startup records and approved functional checks. Signal: consistent fixed provenance across serving instances and expected auth/telemetry behavior. Correlate: replacement and route changes with the approved change time. Benign: stale inventory, cached UI or a historical run can resemble active state. Escalate: mismatched provenance, remaining untrusted access or unresolved incident evidence. Software acceptance does not close the earlier disclosure/deletion question.
🔎 Indicators and observable behaviour:
No CVE-specific malicious IP/domain/hash set or request signature was independently validated. The route description is mechanism evidence, not a tested detection rule.
Investigative leads include unexpected access, unexplained clearing, disagreement with independent collectors or unauthorized configuration change. A graph can also empty after retention, restart, run selection, failed ingestion or database cleanup. Record the source, instance/run, time and alternatives.
Unexplained authenticated use of an applicable standalone BrowserToken service warrants correlation; it does not alone prove token disclosure. Check collection health, direct routes and actual log retention. Potentially deleted data cannot prove its own completeness. No matches must retain their searched assets, interval, filters, limits and gaps.
🧰 Optional CVE checks:
These are documentation- and shell-syntax-reviewed inventory examples only. No project, Docker service or Dashboard was queried. Confirm the approved asset and access; retain outputs privately.
A — Existing AppHost dependency inventory. Assumes .NET 10+, a known project and existing restore assets. `--no-restore` avoids silently restoring dependencies during inspection. Microsoft documents the flags:
```sh
CF_PROJECT='REPLACE_WITH_APPROVED_APPHOST_PROJECT'
dotnet package list --project "$CF_PROJECT" --include-transitive \
--format json --output-version 1 --no-restore
```
Review resolved Dashboard SDK packages, including transitives. Missing/stale restore assets are a gap. This output cannot establish which Dashboard the running AppHost selected, whether it used a CLI/custom path or whether the serving binary changed.
B — Approved container management view. Check the confirmed container's configured image reference alongside actual image identity and deployment evidence. The name is not a digest, signed provenance or proof of the running Dashboard version. A manifest edit does not prove replacement. Docker daemon access is sensitive; do not broaden privileges to inspect it. Neither inventory view is a detector or exploitability test.
🩹 Remediation and verification:
Correct the selected Dashboard to 13.6.5+. 13.6.3 and 13.6.4 are not fixed. A general .NET update is insufficient.
For SDK-based AppHost delivery, update the applicable explicit/central http://Aspire.Hosting.AppHost or implicit Aspire.AppHost.Sdk reference, restore/rebuild, verify resolved Dashboard packages and restart AppHost. For CLI/custom selection, correct that bundle or location. For containers, update the fixed image reference and existing Compose/Kubernetes manifests, then recreate/redeploy.
Verify the active artifact across serving, direct-route and rollback/dormant paths. A green build, restore or image-name string alone cannot establish replacement. Have the owner check intended authentication and normal telemetry behavior through supported acceptance checks.
If correction is delayed, assess temporary access/network restrictions and uncovered routes with the owner. Authentication and secure transport reduce exposure but do not certify the defect repaired. Anonymous access is not a workaround; Unsecured mode remains intentional.
Review frontend, OTLP and API settings separately. Security documentation says the telemetry API is disabled by default; configuration documentation says enabled/API-key secured. Preserve the conflict and inspect effective Dashboard:Api settings for this release.
Where standalone BrowserToken exposure is credible, have the incident lead assess token/session response against its actual lifecycle; the guide recommends a new token each launch. Review other secrets only when evidence justifies the scope. Preserve independent history and use supported database handling. Software acceptance and the earlier deletion/disclosure question need separate closure evidence.
🧾 Evidence separation:
Source facts: Microsoft identity, attributed ranges, 9.1 vector/Important rating, 13.6.5 correction, deletion and conditional token consequences. Release/NuGet/MCR metadata support published availability, not installation.
Dated assessments: Microsoft Publicly Disclosed:No / Exploited:No / Exploitation Less Likely; CISA none/no/partial; KEV non-match in the retained catalog. The bulletin is public now; the disclosure flag remains publication-context metadata, not a claim it is private.
Forecast: FIRST probability 0.009230000, percentile 0.608710000, model date 12th November. GHSA caches percentile 0.60825; retain that difference and use the direct FIRST row. Neither establishes a particular local compromise.
Limits: no runnable public PoC was independently validated. No local exposure, deletion, token disclosure or compromise was established. No exploit, build, detector, update, incident or publication action ran. OSV's exact-CVE404 names the reviewed GHSA alias; it does not mean no ecosystem advisory exists.
🔥 CyberForge verdict:
Prioritize reachable affected Dashboards, correct the selected component and preserve independent history. The documented consequences justify action without an RCE story.
Verify the serving artifact and intended policy, then assess the earlier deletion/disclosure question against its own evidence. A dependency edit alone closes neither. Missing data needs context; no findings are not proof of a clean system.
🔗 Sources and further reading:
Microsoft bulletin: https://github.com/dotnet/announcements/issues/526
Aspire companion: https://github.com/microsoft/aspire/issues/22148
Microsoft assessment: https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-118740
Microsoft CVRF: https://api.msrc.microsoft.com/cvrf/v3.0/cvrf/2026-Nov
Reviewed advisory: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4g86-54fm-h9h8
Fixed release: https://github.com/microsoft/aspire/releases/tag/v13.6.5
Dashboard security: https://aspire.dev/dashboard/security-considerations/
Configuration: https://aspire.dev/dashboard/configuration/
Persistence: https://aspire.dev/dashboard/data-persistence/
Package inventory: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/core/tools/dotnet-package-list
Docker inspection: https://docs.docker.com/reference/cli/docker/inspect/
FIRST exact row: https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-118740
CISA catalog: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog