CVE-2026-12366Disclosure

NVD description

Zephyr's dynamic kernel-object disposal path unref_check() in kernel/userspace/userspace.c frees an object's storage (k_free(dyn->data)) once its reference count reaches zero, after running a per-object-type cleanup. The cleanup switch handled only K_OBJ_MSGQ and K_OBJ_STACK; there was no K_OBJ_TIMER case. A dynamically-allocated, initialized, and armed k_timer keeps its embedded struct _timeout dnode linked in the global timeout queue (_timeout_q), so freeing the timer storage without cancelling the timeout leaves a dangling node in that queue. When the timer next expires, the timeout machinery walks _timeout_q and invokes z_timer_expiration_handler() on the freed node, dereferencing and writing freed (and reusable) kernel heap in kernel/ISR context. This is a deterministic use-after-free that does not depend on SMP: the queued node is simply never unlinked at free time. The disposal is reachable from an unprivileged user thread under CONFIG_USERSPACE + CONFIG_DYNAMIC_OBJECTS: a thread that holds the last permission on such a timer drops it via the k_object_release() syscall (or by exiting, through k_thread_perms_all_clear()), and can arm the timer itself via the k_timer_start() syscall. The free and the expiration handler run at kernel privilege while the actor is a user thread, so the bug is a sandbox-escape memory-corruption primitive usable for privilege escalation. The fix adds k_timer_cleanup() (cancel the timeout and wait for any in-flight handler) and calls it for K_OBJ_TIMER before freeing.