
An agent's approval check blocked find -execdir touch. It waved through find -execdir dd. OmniAgent's ReflexionAgent asks a human before shell commands, but its safe-command check treats anything starting with find as safe. Advisory CVE-2026-125368 (CVSS 7.7, George Chen, Nov 9): find -execdir runs binaries past it. No fix published; the cloned head was vulnerable. I ran the real check in a harness over a fake folder, firing only what it called "safe". 12 hostile find commands: - Approved, no prompt: 4 of 12 - Changed files: 3. -delete removed one, -execdir dd copied one, -fprint wrote a file list. The other 8 blocked only for naming blocklist words (touch, sh, cp, mv, chmod, a bare >); dd, uname, cat or env go straight through. My fix is argv-aware: split into args, reject shell operators, require the program on an allowlist, and for find reject -exec, -execdir, -ok, -okdir, -delete and -fprint. Result: 0 of 12 approved, both harmless ones allowed. Catch: a test harness, not a merged patch; I tested one framework's check, find only. A blocklist of words is not a parser. If your agent auto-approves by first word, check what that program's flags can run: find, git, tar, xargs, rsync all run programs or write files. Approve by what a command does, not by its first word.

