
Signal is active with 1 mentions in latest observed window
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NVD description
agent-device from 0.21.36 before 0.21.37 contains a local file disclosure vulnerability that allows authenticated remote callers to read daemon-host files by opening file:// URLs. Attackers can send an open command with a file:// target through /rpc, then issue snapshot to read any plaintext file readable by the daemon account.
Priority
LOW
Exploitation
NONE
PoC
NONE
Patch
NONE
Momentum
NONE

I POINTED AN AI AGENT'S DEVICE SERVER AT ONE FILE URL. IT HANDED BACK MY FAKE API KEY 5 OF 5 TIMES. agent-device by Callstack lets coding agents drive apps on real devices and simulators. CVE-2026-129130, High 7.7, published November 13: on 0.21.36 and older, a remote caller with a valid token can open a file URL and read it back through snapshot. My test: one Linux box, localhost only, a fake key file, calls through the agent-device proxy with a bearer token. 0.21.36 -> open file URL -> snapshot -> fake key comes back (5/5) 0.21.37 -> same request -> HTTP 400, nothing leaked (0/5) 0.21.37 -> normal http page -> still opens The one command I used (about 5.5 s on my box): npm install agent-device@0.21.37 The catch: it needs a valid token, so it's an insider, leaked-token or shared-proxy risk, not an open door. I tested only the proxy token setup and the file URL path. Prompt for your coding agent (a suggestion, I did not run it): Find every tool in this repo that opens a URL for a remote caller. Reject anything that is not http or https, and add a test proving file URLs are refused. Any agent tool that opens URLs for someone else is a file reader unless it checks the scheme.