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NVD description
United Chargers Grizzl-E Smart 40A FTP URL Path Parsing Stack-based Buffer Overflow Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows network-adjacent attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of United Chargers Grizzl-E Smart 40A EV chargers. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the parsing of FTP URL paths during firmware updates. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of the length of user-supplied data prior to copying it to a fixed-length stack-based buffer. An attacker can leverage this in conjunction with other vulnerabilities to execute code in the context of the device. Was ZDI-CAN-28960.
Priority
LOW
Exploitation
NONE
PoC
NONE
Patch
NONE
Momentum
NONE

🚨 Six unpatched 0-days in the Grizzl-E Smart 40A home EV charger went public today. ZDI says United Chargers hasn't answered a single message since April 14, so there is no fix (!). ZDI-26-1032 to ZDI-26-1037 (CVE-2026-131807 to CVE-2026-131812), CVSS 6.3 to 7.6. All six come from Pwn2Own Automotive 2026 in January -- where 10 entries landed exploits on this one charger and ZDI paid out $177,500 for it. Here's how it works: The charger takes orders over OCPP from a backend server. This can query its settings with GetConfiguration and tell it to download and install new firmware. Two of the bugs let anyone on the charger's network change its OCPP backend settings, one through hard-coded credentials and one with no authentication check at all. A third leaves the Wi-Fi configuration server open with no auth. The charger then installs firmware -- without verifying its integrity. SKShieldus went from a hard-coded credential to code execution through the unverified download for $40,000, and Compass Security did the same from an auth bypass for $25,000. Two stack overflows give other routes in, one when parsing GetConfiguration requests and one in the FTP URL path used for firmware updates. Every bug is rated network-adjacent, so an attacker has to be on the same network as the charger, usually your home Wi-Fi. ZDI published no exploit code and no affected firmware versions, and there are no reports of use in the wild. It also hasn't said exactly how each contest chain was wired beyond those day-one notes. With no patch coming, ZDI's only advice is to restrict who can talk to the device. Put the charger on its own isolated network or a guest Wi-Fi with client isolation, keep visitors and untrusted gadgets off it, and watch for a United Chargers firmware release that names these CVEs.