CVE-2026-13480General(zephyrproject / zephyr)

LOWCVSS 3.1 · LOW

Signal is active with 1 mentions in latest observed window

Immediate actions

  • Track advisory updates for patch or workaround availability

Recommended action window: Monitor and triage in normal cycle

NVD description

The LoRaWAN TS004 Fragmented Data Block Transport handler frag_transport_package_callback() in subsys/lorawan/services/frag_transport.c parses downlink command bytes without validating that enough payload bytes remain before each access. The loop's only bound is rx_pos < len; after consuming the one-byte command id the handler cast rx_buf + rx_pos to a 10-byte struct frag_transport_setup_req, and for a DATA_FRAGMENT command passed &rx_buf[rx_pos] to the fragment decoder, which reads exactly ctx.frag_size bytes — with no remaining-length check in either case. The fragment size is attacker-chosen in a preceding FRAG_SESSION_SETUP command (ctx.frag_size = req->frag_size, capped at CONFIG_LORAWAN_FRAG_TRANSPORT_MAX_FRAG_SIZE, default 232). rx_buf aliases the 255-byte static MacCtx.RxPayload buffer in the loramac-node MAC layer, while len is the actual decrypted payload length. By padding a downlink with mismatched-index DATA_FRAGMENT filler commands (each advancing rx_pos by three bytes without producing an answer) and appending one matching-index fragment near the end of the payload, an attacker can make the decoder read up to roughly frag_size bytes past the end of RxPayload, copying adjacent static memory into the decoder buffers and the FUOTA flash image. The handler runs only on downlinks that have already passed the LoRaWAN frame MIC and FRMPayload decryption, so the defect is reachable only by a party holding the device's session keys (the FUOTA server or an attacker who has compromised those keys). The out-of-bounds bytes are never returned to the sender — the only uplink emitted is a status answer carrying fragment counts — so there is no direct disclosure channel, and on typical flat-memory LoRaWAN MCUs the over-read stays within mapped memory, making a crash unlikely. The impact is therefore a bounded out-of-bounds read with limited confidentiality consequence and no write or control-flow primitive. The fix adds remaining-length guards before each access.

0.0/ 10 priority

Sources & remediation

Weakness type (CWE)
CWE-20CWE-125

Priority

LOW

Exploitation

NONE

PoC

YES

Patch

AVAILABLE

Momentum

NONE

Are you affected?

If you run products in this scope, you should treat this CVE as relevant to your environment.

  • zephyr

Threat summary

  • 1 mentions across 1 observed day

What's happening

  • Technical details provided in 1 signal
  • General: 1 classified signal
  • 1 total mentions across 1 day

Affected systems

Products
zephyr

Deep dive

Activity timeline1 mentions / 1d
00111Mentions · 2026-08-30: 1Technical Details · 2026-08-30: 108-30
Signal classification1 categories
General
1100.0%
Referenced assets1 URL
By indicator
Full discourse1 post
  • CVE@CVEnew
    General

    CVE-2026-13480 The LoRaWAN TS004 Fragmented Data Block Transport handler frag_transport_package_callback() in subsys/lorawan/services/frag_transport.c parses downlink command bytes … https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-13480

    Post summary

    The text notes that CVE-2026-13480 involves a LoRaWAN handler function parsing downlink command bytes and provides a link to the CVE record, without further elaboration.

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CPE platform detail1 entries

1 of 1 entries

PartVendorProductVersionTarget SWTarget HW
OSzephyrprojectzephyr---

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