CVE-2026-13795(apple / chrome)

LOWCVSS 6.5 · MEDIUM

Signal is active with 1 mentions in latest observed window

Immediate actions

  • Track advisory updates for patch or workaround availability

Recommended action window: Monitor and triage in normal cycle

NVD description

Insufficient policy enforcement in Chrome for iOS in Google Chrome on iOS prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker to bypass navigation restrictions via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)

0.5/ 10 priority

Sources & remediation

Weakness type (CWE)
CWE-602

Priority

LOW

Exploitation

NONE

PoC

NONE

Patch

NONE

Momentum

STABLE

Are you affected?

If you run products in this scope, you should treat this CVE as relevant to your environment.

  • chrome
  • iphone_os

Threat summary

  • 3 mentions across 2 observed days
  • Momentum state: stable

What's happening

  • Peaked 1d ago at 2 mentions (2026-09-24); latest day: 1
  • 3 total mentions across 2 days

Affected systems

Products
chromeiphone_os

1 version affected across 2 products

Deep dive

Activity timeline3 mentions / 2d
01122Mentions · 2026-09-24: 2Mentions · 2026-09-25: 109-2409-25
Referenced assets1 URL
By indicator
Full discourse3 posts
  • Doyensec@Doyensec

    One tap was enough to bypass a Chrome for iOS security check. We found a way to use shortcuts to reach tel: or facetime: without Chrome applying its normal user-interaction checks to the final URL. The issue, CVE-2026-13795, has been fixed. Details 👇 https://blog.doyensec.com/2026/09/24/chrome-ios-policy-bypass.html #appsec #doyensec #security #ios

    4601751.0K
    4.3K followersView on X
  • Mr.Niko@_MrNiko

    one tap in Chrome for iOS. the phone dials. CVE-2026-13795. Chrome prompts on random app schemes. shortcuts:// gets a free pass. x-error fires after the shortcut fails. tel: never goes back through Chrome. direct tel: needed a recent tap. this path does not. same trick works for facetime:. fixed by prompting before any shortcuts:// or workflow://. credit: Leonardo Giovannini / Doyensec https://blog.doyensec.com/2026/09/24/chrome-ios-policy-bypass.html #iOS #AppSec #InfoSec

    10052739
    1.3K followersView on X
  • DFIR Radar@DFIR_Radar

    CVE-2026-13795: A single tap on a malicious webpage bypassed Chrome for iOS call-initiation protections by routing tel: through Apple Shortcuts as a callback, triggering phone calls without user confirmation. - Chrome for iOS explicitly guards tel: and facetime: URLs via a user-gesture check in app_launcher_tab_helper.mm, but it granted shortcuts:// and its legacy alias workflow:// unconditional trust as Apple-native apps, skipping the confirmation prompt entirely. - The attack chain: malicious anchor tag pointing to shortcuts://run-shortcut?name=nonexistent&x-error=tel%3A%2F%2FNUMBER, one tap sends Chrome to Shortcuts, the nonexistent shortcut errors, Shortcuts fires the x-error callback directly to iOS, and Chrome never sees the tel: URL. facetime: works the same way. - The bypass is clean because Shortcuts calls UIApplication openURL for the callback itself. Chrome approved step one and was never consulted for step two, the step that caused the sensitive action. - The Chromium fix (issue 476591032, change 7838361) moves the prompt to the first handoff: Chrome now alerts before opening any shortcuts:// or workflow:// URL, covering x-success, x-cancel, and x-error in one stroke. Hunt for this in mobile threat triage: look for single-tap navigations to shortcuts:// or workflow:// containing URL-encoded tel: or facetime: parameters in query strings. Patch Chrome for iOS to the version including change 7838361. #DFIR_Radar

    40021225
    1.9K followersView on X
CPE platform detail2 entries

2 of 2 entries

PartVendorProductVersionTarget SWTarget HW
OSappleiphone_os---
Appgooglechrome---

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