CVE-2026-28666Disclosure(google / android)

LOWCVSS 8.8 · HIGH

Exploit discussion active in current signal (1 latest mentions)

Immediate actions

  • Hunt for exploitation attempts and persistence artifacts
  • Increase monitoring for publicly documented tradecraft
  • Track advisory updates for patch or workaround availability

Recommended action window: High priority (within 72h)

NVD description

In multiple functions of LocalImageResolver.java, there is a possible Remote Persistent Denial of Service due to a DNG image rendering check bypass. This could lead to remote escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.

1.5/ 10 priority

Sources & remediation

Weakness type (CWE)
CWE-863

Priority

LOW

Exploitation

NONE

PoC

YES

Patch

NONE

Momentum

NONE

Are you affected?

If you run products in this scope, you should treat this CVE as relevant to your environment.

  • android

Threat summary

  • Public PoC is present in monitored signal
  • 1 mentions across 1 observed day

What's happening

  • PoC mentioned or linked in 1 signal
  • Technical details provided in 1 signal
  • Disclosure: 1 classified signal
  • 1 total mentions across 1 day

Affected systems

Vendors
Products
android

4 versions affected across 1 product

Deep dive

Activity timeline1 mentions / 1d
00111Mentions · 2026-09-16: 1PoC Mentioned / Linked · 2026-09-16: 1Technical Details · 2026-09-16: 109-16
Signal classification1 categories
Disclosure
1100.0%
Referenced assets1 URL
By indicator
Full discourse1 post
  • hackyboiz@hackyboiz2
    Disclosure

    [1day-1line] CVE-2026-28666: Exposure of Untrusted RAW Decoders in SystemUI via a mimetype Check Bypass in Android LocalImageResolver Hello, this is Libera. Today's 1day-1line covers a check bypass in Android's notification image path. Google added a mimetype allowlist to LocalImageResolver to keep the bug-prone RAW decoders out of the notification path, but the check was wired into only 1 of its 7 call sites. As a result, an attacker app can run the blocked DNG decoder inside the SystemUI process with a single setLargeIcon() call. Depending on the decoded content, this can lead to a Persistent DoS or EOP. Please refer to the blog post for more details (Root Cause, PoC, and Patch info)! https://hackyboiz.github.io/2026/09/16/Libera/CVE-2026-28666/

    Post summary

    The post discloses an Android LocalImageResolver mimetype check bypass that allows a local app to invoke the DNG decoder in SystemUI, with a link to a blog containing root cause, PoC, and patch information.

    04023162.6K
    582 followersView on X
CPE platform detail5 entries

5 of 5 entries

PartVendorProductVersionTarget SWTarget HW
OSgoogleandroid14.0--
OSgoogleandroid15.0--
OSgoogleandroid16.0--
OSgoogleandroid16.0--
OSgoogleandroid17.0--

Explore more