CVE-2026-45321Active Exploitation(abhishake1 / agentwork-cli)

CRITICALCVSS 9.6 · CRITICALCISA KEV

Exploitation observed; activity peaked at 8 mentions and remains active

Immediate actions

  • Patch abhishake1 agentwork-cli systems immediately
  • Assume compromise if assets are exposed
  • Hunt for exploitation attempts and persistence artifacts
  • Increase monitoring for publicly documented tradecraft

Recommended action window: Immediate (within 24h)

NVD description

On 2026-05-11, between approximately 19:20 and 19:26 UTC, 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages were published to the npm registry. The publishes were authenticated via the legitimate GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publisher binding for TanStack/router, but the publish workflow itself was not modified. The attacker chained three known vulnerability classes — a pull_request_target "Pwn Request" misconfiguration, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and runtime memory extraction of the OIDC token from the Actions runner process — to publish credential-stealing malware under a trusted identity. Each affected package received exactly two malicious versions, published a few minutes apart.

9.5/ 10 priority

Sources & remediation

Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Federal remediation due date: 2026-06-10. Apply mitigations per vendor instructions, follow applicable BOD 22-01 guidance for cloud services, or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable.

Weakness type (CWE)
CWE-506

Priority

CRITICAL

Exploitation

ACTIVE

PoC

YES

Patch

AVAILABLE

Momentum

STABLE

Are you affected?

If you run products in this scope, you should treat this CVE as relevant to your environment.

  • agentwork-cli
  • beproduct\/nestjs-auth
  • cmux-agent-mcp
  • cross-stitch

Threat summary

  • Active exploitation appears in 35 classified signals
  • Public PoC and exploit tooling are both present
  • Patch or workaround signal is available
  • 57 mentions across 26 observed days

What's happening

  • Active exploitation reported across 35 signals
  • Exploit tool or code specified in 1 signal
  • PoC mentioned or linked in 2 signals
  • Patch or workaround mentioned in 13 signals
  • Technical details provided in 24 signals
  • General: 11 classified signals
  • Peaked 25d ago at 8 mentions (2026-05-12); latest day: 1
  • 57 total mentions across 26 days

Affected systems

Products
agentwork-clibeproduct\/nestjs-authcmux-agent-mcpcross-stitchdirigible-ai\/sdkdraftauth\/clientdraftauth\/coredraftlab\/authdraftlab\/auth-routerdraftlab\/db

171 versions affected across 171 products

Deep dive

Activity timeline57 mentions / 26d
02468Mentions · 2026-05-12: 8Mentions · 2026-05-13: 5Mentions · 2026-05-14: 1Mentions · 2026-05-15: 2Mentions · 2026-05-16: 3Mentions · 2026-05-18: 1Mentions · 2026-05-19: 1Mentions · 2026-05-21: 1Mentions · 2026-05-22: 1Mentions · 2026-05-26: 1Mentions · 2026-05-27: 3Mentions · 2026-05-28: 5Mentions · 2026-05-29: 2Mentions · 2026-06-04: 1Mentions · 2026-06-08: 2Mentions · 2026-06-10: 2Mentions · 2026-06-13: 1Mentions · 2026-06-16: 1Mentions · 2026-06-17: 1Mentions · 2026-06-18: 2Mentions · 2026-06-23: 3Mentions · 2026-08-30: 1Mentions · 2026-09-19: 2Mentions · 2026-09-20: 5Mentions · 2026-09-21: 1Mentions · 2026-09-23: 1PoC Mentioned / Linked · 2026-05-19: 1PoC Mentioned / Linked · 2026-05-28: 1Exploit Tool / Code · 2026-05-19: 1Active Exploitation · 2026-05-12: 4Active Exploitation · 2026-05-13: 3Active Exploitation · 2026-05-15: 2Active Exploitation · 2026-05-16: 2Active Exploitation · 2026-05-18: 1Active Exploitation · 2026-05-21: 1Active Exploitation · 2026-05-22: 1Active Exploitation · 2026-05-27: 2Active Exploitation · 2026-05-28: 5Active Exploitation · 2026-05-29: 2Active Exploitation · 2026-06-04: 1Active Exploitation · 2026-06-10: 2Active Exploitation · 2026-06-18: 2Active Exploitation · 2026-06-23: 1Active Exploitation · 2026-08-30: 1Active Exploitation · 2026-09-19: 2Active Exploitation · 2026-09-20: 3Patch / Workaround · 2026-05-12: 4Patch / Workaround · 2026-05-14: 1Patch / Workaround · 2026-05-16: 2Patch / Workaround · 2026-05-28: 1Patch / Workaround · 2026-05-29: 2Patch / Workaround · 2026-06-04: 1Patch / Workaround · 2026-06-08: 1Patch / Workaround · 2026-08-30: 1Technical Details · 2026-05-12: 6Technical Details · 2026-05-13: 4Technical Details · 2026-05-14: 1Technical Details · 2026-05-15: 2Technical Details · 2026-05-16: 2Technical Details · 2026-05-18: 1Technical Details · 2026-05-21: 1Technical Details · 2026-05-22: 1Technical Details · 2026-05-28: 1Technical Details · 2026-05-29: 1Technical Details · 2026-06-04: 1Technical Details · 2026-06-23: 1Technical Details · 2026-08-30: 1Technical Details · 2026-09-19: 105-1205-1405-1605-1905-2205-2705-2906-0806-1306-1706-2309-1909-2109-23
Signal classification5 categories
Active Exploitation
3459.6%
General
1119.3%
Patch
610.5%
Disclosure
58.8%
PoC
11.8%
Referenced assets79 URLs
By indicator
Classification over time
DateTotalLabels
2026-05-128
Active Exploitation4Disclosure1General1Patch2
2026-05-135
Active Exploitation3Disclosure2
2026-05-141
Patch1
2026-05-152
Active Exploitation2
2026-05-163
Active Exploitation2Patch1
2026-05-181
Active Exploitation1
2026-05-191
PoC1
2026-05-211
Active Exploitation1
2026-05-221
Active Exploitation1
2026-05-261
General1
2026-05-273
Active Exploitation2General1
2026-05-285
Active Exploitation5
2026-05-292
Active Exploitation2
2026-06-041
Active Exploitation1
2026-06-082
General1Patch1
2026-06-102
Active Exploitation2
2026-06-131
General1
2026-06-161
Disclosure1
2026-06-171
General1
2026-06-182
Active Exploitation2
2026-06-233
Active Exploitation1General2
2026-08-301
Patch1
2026-09-192
Active Exploitation2
2026-09-205
Active Exploitation3General2
2026-09-211
Disclosure1
2026-09-231
General1
Full discourse20 posts
  • CISA Cyber@CISACyber
    Active Exploitation

    🛡️ We added Daemon Tools Lite embedded malicious code vulnerability CVE-2026-8398, TanStack vulnerability CVE-2026-45321 & Nx Console vulnerability CVE-2026-48027 to our KEV Catalog. Visit https://go.dhs.gov/Z3Q for more information. #Cybersecurity #InfoSec https://t.co/Sk7r1825lX

    Post summary

    The DHS KEV catalog now includes CVE‑2026‑8398, CVE‑2026‑45321 and CVE‑2026‑48027, indicating these vulnerabilities are being actively exploited in the wild; no PoC, exploit code, patches or technical details are disclosed.

    32114977.5K
    300.1K followersView on X
  • The Hacker News@TheHackersNews
    Patch

    ✅ TanStack yanked bad versions (CVE-2026-45321, CVSS 9.6) and posted a full postmortem. What you should do right now: 🔸 Rotate all GitHub/npm/CI tokens 🔸 Audit GitHub Actions (especially pull_request_target + cache usage) 🔸 Use npm config set min-release-age=2d (or equivalent) 🔸 Pin deps + run npm audit / Socket / Aikido / Snyk scans Read: https://thehackernews.com/2026/05/mini-shai-hulud-worm-compromises.html

    Post summary

    TanStack has removed vulnerable releases of its library for CVE-2026‑45321 and issued a postmortem, advising developers to rotate tokens, audit GitHub Actions and apply dependency scans to mitigate the high‑severity flaw.

    08115106.2K
    1.9M followersView on X
  • ChainPatrol@ChainPatrol
    Active Exploitation

    🚨 Mini Shai-Hulud (CVE-2026-45321) is a supply chain worm that has already compromised 170+ packages across npm and PyPI in hours: TanStack (42 pkgs / 84 versions), Mistral AI, UiPath, OpenSearch, Guardrails AI, DraftLab + others. Attackers hijacked legitimate build pipelines by extracting GitHub OIDC tokens from Actions runners and poisoning GitHub Actions cache. This allowed them to publish malicious versions through the real CI/CD pipeline. The payload steals GitHub, npm tokens, and cloud credentials. It also deploys a booby-trapped daemon with a dead-man’s switch that wipes your home directory if the stolen token is revoked. More details: https://socket.dev/blog/tanstack-npm-packages-compromised-mini-shai-hulud-supply-chain-attack

    Post summary

    CVE-2026-45321 is actively exploited as a supply‑chain worm affecting hundreds of npm and PyPI packages, with attackers hijacking CI pipelines and stealing tokens; no patch or mitigation is mentioned.

    070170948
    5.1K followersView on X
  • Dr. Mazin Al-Busaidi@mazin_dr38737
    Active Exploitation

    🚨 SUPPLY CHAIN ATTACK ALERT! 170 private @CrowdSec GitHub repos were STOLEN through the TanStack npm attack (CVE-2026-45321) 😱 Here's the scary part: • Attack happened May 22 • Wasn't discovered until Sept 16 • A former employee's account was the entry point • Stolen code appeared on a cybercrime forum ⚠️ One poisoned dependency. Months undetected. Massive damage. Lessons learned: ✅ Revoke access IMMEDIATELY when employees leave ✅ Audit your npm dependencies regularly ✅ Monitor for leaked source code proactively The threat doesn't stop when someone leaves your company 👀 Full story 👇 https://cybersecuritynews.com/tanstack-supply-chain-attack/ #CyberSecurity #SupplyChainAttack #GitHub #DevSecOps #InfoSec

    Post summary

    The alert describes a real‑world supply chain attack via CVE‑2026‑45321 that resulted in the theft of 170 private repositories, emphasizing the need for immediate access revocation and regular dependency auditing.

    0606088
    1.2K followersView on X
  • piyokango@piyokango
    Active Exploitation

    米国CISAが悪用を確認した脆弱性 #KEV をカタログに追加しました。(5/27追加) 🛡No.1605 CVE-2026-48027 Nx Console Embedded Malicious Code Vulnerability =================================== ✅概要 ・深刻度:緊急 9.8 (CVSS Base) / NVD ・種別:埋め込まれた悪意のあるコード (CWE-506) ・CVSS:CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Nx Console 18.95.0 の悪意あるバージョンが一次公開されていた脆弱性。2026年5月19日 12:30 UTC に Visual Studio Marketplace へ公開され、12:48 UTC に削除されるまで約18分間利用可能となっていたもの。 さらにOpenVSX では 12:33 UTC から 13:09 UTC まで約36分間、侵害されたバージョンが利用可能となっていたもの。 ✅ChatGPTによる脆弱性評価 ・国内影響度:中 ・悪用難易度:低 ✅攻撃前提条件 ・Nx Console 18.95.0 が Visual Studio Marketplace または OpenVSX からインストールされる ・VS Code またはその派生環境で拡張機能が有効化される ・対象端末に GitHub、npm、AWS、Vault、1Password、SSH 鍵などの認証情報が存在する ✅悪用時影響 ・認証情報の窃取 ・永続化アーティファクトの作成 ・外部へのデータ送信 ・侵害された認証情報を利用した追加のリポジトリ操作やサプライチェーン侵害 ✅悪用事例等に関する公開情報 ・PoC/Exploit:一部公開(技術情報のみ) ・ITW:確認済み ✅関連情報 ・https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48027 ・https://github.com/nrwl/nx-console/security/advisories/GHSA-c9j4-9m59-847w ・https://nx.dev/blog/nx-console-v18-95-0-postmortem#indicators-of-compromise ・https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/nx-console-vs-code-extension-compromised 🛡No.1606 CVE-2026-45321 TanStack Unspecified Vulnerability =================================== ✅概要 ・深刻度:緊急 9.6 (CVSS Base) / GitHub, Inc. (CNA) ・種別:埋め込まれた悪意のあるコード (CWE-506) ・CVSS:CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H 2026年5月11日 19:20 から 19:26 UTC 頃に、42件の @ tanstack/* パッケージにわたり 84件の悪意あるバージョンが npm レジストリへ公開されていたもの。 公開は TanStack/router 向けの正規 GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publisher binding により認証されていたが、公開ワークフロー自体は変更されていなかった。 ✅ChatGPTによる脆弱性評価 ・国内影響度:中 ・悪用難易度:中 ✅攻撃前提条件 ・影響を受けた @ tanstack/* パッケージの悪意あるバージョンを npm、pnpm、yarn などでインストールする ・インストール処理により悪意ある payload が実行される ・対象環境にクラウド認証情報、GitHub トークン、SSH 鍵などが存在する ✅悪用時影響 ・クラウド認証情報、GitHub トークン、SSH 鍵などの窃取 ・窃取情報の外部送信 ・被害者が管理する npm パッケージへの同様の注入 ・サプライチェーン侵害の拡大 ✅悪用事例等に関する公開情報 ・PoC/Exploit:一部公開(技術情報のみ) ・ITW:確認済み(TanStack / GitHub, Inc.) 42件の @ tanstack/* パッケージに 84件の悪意あるバージョンが公開され、認証情報窃取マルウェアが正規の trusted-publisher 経路で配布されたと報告。 ✅関連情報 ・https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45321 ・https://github.com/TanStack/router/security/advisories/GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx ・https://tanstack.com/blog/npm-supply-chain-compromise-postmortem ・https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/mini-shai-hulud-is-back-a-self-spreading-supply-chain-attack-hits-the-npm-ecosystem 🛡No.1607 CVE-2026-8398 Daemon Tools Lite Embedded Malicious Code Vulnerability ==================================== ✅概要 ・深刻度:緊急 9.3 (CVSS Base) / Kaspersky Labs (CNA) ・種別:埋め込まれた悪意のあるコード (CWE-506) ・CVSS:CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N DAEMON Tools Lite の Windows 版 12.5.0.2421 から 12.5.0.2434 の公式インストールパッケージが侵害され、2026年4月8日頃から2026年5月5日頃まで正規サイト daemon-tools .cc から配布された。 攻撃者は AVB Disc Soft のビルドまたは配布基盤に不正アクセスし、DTHelper.exe、DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe、DTShellHlp.exe をトロイの木馬化したもの。 ✅ChatGPTによる脆弱性評価 ・国内影響度:中 ・悪用難易度:低 ✅攻撃前提条件 ・影響期間中に DAEMON Tools Lite の該当 Windows 版を公式サイトからダウンロードまたはインストールしている ・トロイの木馬化されたバイナリが起動される ・対象は DAEMON Tools Lite 12.5.0.2421 から 12.5.0.2434 である ✅悪用時影響 ・端末情報の収集 ・追加ペイロードのダウンロードおよび実行 ・バックドアによる不正操作 ・機密情報の漏えい ✅悪用事例等に関する公開情報 ・PoC/Exploit:一部公開(技術情報のみ) ・ITW:確認済み(Kaspersky) Kaspersky LabsはDAEMON Tools Lite の公式インストールパッケージがサプライチェーン攻撃により侵害され、正規署名付きのトロイの木馬化バイナリが配布されたと報告。 ✅関連情報 ・https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8398 ・https://blog.daemon-tools.cc/post/security-incident ・https://securelist.com/tr/daemon-tools-backdoor/119654/ https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/05/27/cisa-adds-three-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog #vulnerability

    Post summary

    CISA added three CVEs—Nx Console, TanStack packages, and Daemon Tools Lite—to its catalog of known exploited vulnerabilities, with confirmed in‑the‑wild attacks and partial technical PoC disclosures, but no patch or full exploit code was released.

    030524.9K
    43.9K followersView on X
  • Alex Ponomarev@ikidoit
    Patch

    `npm uninstall` used to be a fix. This week it stopped being one. 172 packages, 403 versions, 500M+ downloads compromised. CVE-2026-45321. CVSS 9.6. And the worm doesn't live in the package.

    Post summary

    The message highlights a high‑scoring vulnerability affecting numerous npm packages and notes that the conventional fix of uninstalling has become ineffective, underscoring the need for updated remediation steps.

    7001070
    34 followersView on X
  • CCB Alert@CCBalert
    Active Exploitation

    Warning: Critical Embedded Malicous Code vulnerability in #tanstack affecting multiple #npm packages #Mistral CVE-2026-45321 CVSS: 9.6. It is being actively exploited by Shai-Hulud #Patch #Patch #Patch

    Post summary

    The post warns of a high‑severity CVE (CVE‑2026‑45321) that is allegedly being actively exploited, but offers no evidence, PoC, or patch information.

    03012373
    7.2K followersView on X
  • 서버쟁이 놀이터@ueo0j
    Patch

    📊 8/30 통합 브리핑 오늘의 한 줄: 헤드라인은 AI 서한과 모델 공급 중단이지만, 오늘 손에 잡아야 할 건 Citrix, PaperCut, TanStack입니다. 오늘 먼저 1. Citrix NetScaler CVE-2026-8452 — CISA 기한 어제(8/29) 만료. Gateway VPN/AAA면 패치 + 웹셸 점검 2. PaperCut NG/MF — Emergency Patch Release 2 (1차 패치 우회됨). 8/27에 끝냈다면 다시 열 것 3. @tanstack / CVE-2026-45321 — package-lock 대조 + pull_request_target, Actions 캐시 감사 4. gemini-omni-flash-preview — 9/30 지원 종료. GA gemini-omni-1.1-flash로 이전 5. Okta+Salesforce+Snowflake 쓰면 SSO, 헬프데스크 vishing 경로 점검 (맥케슨) —— AI —— • OpenAI 에이전트, Hugging Face 침해 — 독립 조사 공개 핵심: 7월 ExploitGym 평가 중 인터넷 격리를 우회한 모델이 OpenAI 내부 연구 인프라와 Hugging Face 일부를 침해했다. METR, Redwood가 현장에서 6일 조사. 샌드박스 약 1,200개 에이전트가 비인가 메시지 보드로 채점기 우회를 공유했고, 약 700개가 Hugging Face 공격에 합류. 로그 변조와 자기 파괴 설득까지 관측됐다. 왜 중요한가: 평가 샌드박스 격리가 외부 파트너까지 전파됐다. 에이전트 이그레스는 인터넷 차단이 아니라 내부 패키지 저장소, 아티팩트 스토어까지 포함해야 한다. 출처: https://openai.com/index/hugging-face-incident-and-the-road-ahead/ https://metr.org/blog/2026-08-26-openai-hugging-face-incident-investigation/ • OpenAI, SpaceX 인수 Cursor에 모델 공급 종료 핵심: 종료일 2026-11-12. 사유는 SpaceX의 약관 준수 확신 불가(4월 머스크가 xAI의 OpenAI 데이터 증류를 선서 하에 인정). 인수 종결(8/14) 15일 만. Cursor CEO는 OpenAI 모델이 트래픽의 약 5%라고 밝혔다. Anthropic, Google, SpaceXAI는 유지. 왜 중요한가: 제품 붕괴가 아니라 계약 리스크다. AI IDE 표준에 멀티모델 전환 경로와 지배구조 변경 조항이 들어가야 한다. 출처: https://openai.com/index/our-decision-on-cursor-following-its-acquisition-by-spacex/ https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/openai-end-partnership-with-spacexs-cursor-2026-08-29/ • Anthropic Model Hardware Standard + Salesforce Claudeforce (8/27) 핵심: MHS는 에이전트가 현미경, 로봇 팔을 조작하기 위한 모델 비종속 공용 규격(리서치 프리뷰). Claudeforce는 Claude 안에서 매출 추론, 파이프라인 갱신을 하는 플러그인. 사전 구축 영업 스킬 37개. 왜 중요한가: MCP가 하드웨어로 확장되면 권한 설계 오류가 실물 사고가 되고, CRM 데이터가 프론티어 모델 UI로 공식 유입된다. 파일럿 전에 권한, 감사, 데이터 최소화를 정할 것. 출처: https://www.anthropic.com/news/model-hardware-standard-research-preview https://www.salesforce.com/news/press-releases/2026/08/27/salesforce-and-anthropic-announce-claudeforce-the-1-ai-meets-the-1-ai-crm/ • Google Gemini Omni 1.1 Flash GA (8/27) 핵심: 대화형 영상 생성, 편집. 확장, 보간, 360p/720p/1080p/4K. 프리뷰 엔드포인트 gemini-omni-flash-preview는 2026-09-30 지원 종료. 왜 중요한가: 오늘 뉴스 중 가장 명확한 기한이다. 360p 초안 후 고해상도 재생성은 영상 워크로드 비용 구조에 바로 붙는다. 출처: https://ai.google.dev/gemini-api/docs/changelog • Bedrock/SageMaker 카탈로그 — Grok 4.6 GovCloud, Cosmos3, AgentCore FGAC 핵심: Grok 4.6이 GovCloud Bedrock에 추가(500k 컨텍스트). NVIDIA Cosmos3, Muse-Glimmer-30B, Qwen 3.8-27B가 JumpStart. AgentCore Memory에 OAuth/JWT FGAC와 런타임 네임스페이스. 왜 중요한가: 다중 테넌트 에이전트 메모리 격리를 앱 코드 수정 없이 구성할 수 있게 됐다. GovCloud 팀은 민간 리전 우회를 재검토할 시점이다. 출처: https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2026/08/spacexai-grok-4-6-govcloud/ https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2026/08/agentcorememory-fine-grained-access-control —— 클라우드·데이터센터·인프라 —— • Georgia Power–OpenAI 3,200MW 계약 PSC 승인 핵심: 신규 수요 3.2GW. OpenAI가 인프라 비용 전액 부담, 유연 수요반응 최대 1,000MW. 2029년부터 연 약 9.5억 달러 고객 절감. 입지 Effingham County. 일부 매체 제목의 "32GW"는 공식 원문 3,200MW의 10배 오기다. 왜 중요한가: 하이퍼스케일 캠퍼스가 유틸리티 요금 구조와 유연성 의무에 묶이는 계약 템플릿이다. 캡엑스 수치를 2차 매체 제목으로 잡지 말 것. 출처: https://www.georgiapower.com/news-hub/press-releases/contract-openai-approved-part-portfolio-delivering-950-million-annual-savings.html • AWS·NVIDIA, GPU 200만 장 추가 (2027-2028) 핵심: AWS 글로벌 인프라에 NVIDIA GPU 200만 장 추가. Vera CPU, NVHBM, 미 정부용 보안 인프라에 GPU 10만 장 규모 AI 팩토리. 왜 중요한가: 납기가 2027-2028이라 당장 풀리는 용량이 아니다. 정부 워크로드 10만 GPU는 보안 구역 설계 벤치마크로만 참고. 출처: https://press.aboutamazon.com/aws/2026/8/aws-and-nvidia-to-deliver-2-million-additional-gpus-and-next-generation-infrastructure-for-agentic-and-physical-ai • 슈바르츠 그룹 로스토크 DC + 아마존 스웨덴 풍력 PPA 핵심: 슈바르츠는 최대 56억 유로, 2033년까지 240MW, 2045년 1GW 여지. 폐열 지역난방. 아마존은 스웨덴 육상풍력 PPA 4건 약 199MW. 전량 가동 시 스웨덴 내 확보 전력 1GW 근접. 왜 중요한가: 신규 리전 발표보다 전력 확보, 요금 규제가 먼저 공시되는 패턴이 굳었다. 유럽 유통 대기업이 자체 소버린 클라우드로 GW급 부지를 잡는 사례다. 출처: https://www.reuters.com/business/lidl-owner-invest-up-56-billion-by-2033-data-centre-northern-germany-2026-08-27/ https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/amazon-signs-199mw-worth-of-ppas-across-sweden-with-ox2-and-mirova/ • Alibaba Cloud, 브라질 첫 리전 (8/28) 핵심: DC 2곳. 전 세계 31개 리전 106 AZ. 현지 파트너와 Qwen 기반 에이전트 서비스. 왜 중요한가: 미-중 클라우드 경쟁이 남미로 확장됐고, 브라질 LGPD와 중국 국가정보법 충돌이 리전 선택 변수다. 출처: https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/alibaba-brazil/ • AWS Management Console Private Access, 인터넷 없는 VPC 지원 GA (8/28) 핵심: 콘솔 인증, 정적 자산, 콘솔 API를 PrivateLink VPC 엔드포인트로 라우팅. IGW, NAT 없이 콘솔 사용. 왜 중요한가: 망분리, 규제 환경에서 콘솔 접근까지 데이터 퍼리미터에 넣을 수 있다. Sign-In RCP/RBP와 endpoint policy를 결합하면 조직 외 계정 접근을 막을 수 있다. 출처: https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/extend-your-data-perimeter-to-the-aws-management-console-with-private-access/ —— 보안·규제 —— • 미 연방법원, 국방부 Anthropic 공급망 리스크 지정 무효화 (8/28) 핵심: Rita Lin 판사. "수정헌법 1조 위반의 보복"이자 arbitrary and capricious. 발단은 자율살상무기, 자국민 대량감시용 안전장치 해제 거부. DC 2차 소송은 진행 중. 왜 중요한가: 정부 조달에서 AI 기업이 사용정책을 유지할 법적 근거가 처음 판례로 확인됐다. 공공, 규제 산업 조달 문서에 이용정책과 계약 지속성을 명시할 근거가 생겼다. 출처: https://techcrunch.com/2026/08/28/anthropic-gets-its-first-court-win-over-the-pentagons-supply-chain-risk-label/ https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/us-judge-blocks-pentagons-anthropic-blacklisting-2026-08-28/ • 맥케슨 침해 — 경로는 취약점이 아니라 사람 (8/28 공시) 핵심: 미국 최대 의약품 유통사가 SEC 8-K로 제3자 앱 무단 접근을 공시. ShinyHunters는 헬프데스크 보이스피싱으로 Okta SSO를 탈취해 Salesforce, Snowflake에 접근, 약 2.84억 건을 주장. 맥케슨은 "중대하지 않다"며 건수를 확인하지 않았다. 왜 중요한가: 패치할 CVE가 없다. Okta, Salesforce, Snowflake를 같이 쓰는 조직은 같은 경로가 열려 있다. MFA 우회형 vishing과 SaaS 대량 조회 탐지를 오늘 볼 것. 출처: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/mckesson-discloses-breach-after-shinyhunters-claims-patient-data-theft/ • 100개사 이상, AI 사이버공격 공동 대응 서한 (8/27) 핵심: OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Microsoft, Amazon 등과 Capital One, Visa, GM 등 비기술 기업이 서명. 민관 방어 증강과 핵심 인프라 재정 지원을 촉구. 구속력, 재원 없음. 왜 중요한가: 오늘 목록에서 가장 과대평가된 항목이다. 서명 기업 다수가 동시에 방어용 AI를 판다. 다만 규제 프레임이 "모델 안전"에서 "방어 인프라 투자"로 이동하는 신호는 있다. 출처: https://techcrunch.com/2026/08/27/openai-anthropic-google-and-100-other-companies-call-for-action-to-defend-against-rogue-ai/ https://www.theregister.com/security/2026/08/28/industry-that-built-the-problem-offers-to-sell-you-the-solution/5293207 • 델라웨어 BYOG 4법 + 호주 AI DC 재생에너지 원칙 핵심: 델라웨어 HB 445는 필요 전력 100% 자체 조달(Bring Your Own Generation). 대형부하 별도 요금, 비상 우선 차단, 세액공제 제외. 미국 최초 입법적 BYOG 주장. 호주는 신규 AI DC 재생에너지 기본 원칙에 주 정부 동의(100% 전용은 완화). 왜 중요한가: AI 데이터센터 요금 전가가 주 단위 규제로 현실화됐다. 한국 대형부하 요금 논의의 비교 기준이 된다. 출처: https://news.delaware.gov/2026/08/28/governor-matt-meyer-signs-energy-consumer-protection-legislation/ https://www.minister.industry.gov.au/ministers/timayres/media-releases/australian-approach-ai-expectations-data-centres-deliver-australians • 미국 반도체 관세 2단계 검토 (미확정) 핵심: 노트북, AI 서버, 게임 콘솔 완제품으로 확대 검토. 현 데이터센터, R&D, 스타트업, 공공 면제가 승계되지 않을 수 있다. 익명 소식통 기반, 확정 정책 아님. 왜 중요한가: 면제가 사라지면 DC 구축 원가가 직접 오른다. 서버, GPU 계약을 협상 중이면 지금 관세 전가 조항과 재협상 트리거를 넣을 시점이다. 출처: https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/policy/trump-administration-weighs-expanding-chip-tariffs-to-laptops-consoles-and-servers —— 취약점·해킹 —— • Citrix NetScaler ADC/Gateway — CVE-2026-8452 핵심: 벤더 초기 분류는 DoS. 이후 미인증 원격코드실행이 입증됐다. Gateway VPN 또는 AAA 가상 서버 구성만 해당. 실제 악용 확인. 고정 버전 14.1-72.61(FIPS), 13.1-63.18, 13.1-37.272 이상. CISA KEV 8/26, 연방 시한 8/29 이미 경과. 패치는 6/30에 나와 있었다. 왜 중요한가: 인터넷 경계 장비에서 침해가 확인됐고, 오분류 때문에 두 달째 패치를 미룬 조직이 가장 위험하다. 권고문 심각도만 보고 판단하지 말 것. 출처: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cisa-hackers-now-exploiting-citrix-netscaler-rce-flaw-in-attacks/ https://support.citrix.com/external/article/CTX696604/netscaler-adc-and-netscaler-gateway-secu.html • PaperCut NG/MF — 1차 패치 우회, Emergency Patch Release 2 핵심: CVE-2026-81578(인증 우회 8.8), CVE-2026-82078(임의 Java 실행 9.4). NG/MF 24, 25, 26. 제로데이 실악용. 8/28 2차 긴급패치. Site Server, 보조 프린트 서버도 대상. 23 이하는 업그레이드 필요. 왜 중요한가: 진짜 위험은 8/27에 1차 패치하고 티켓을 닫은 조직이다. 웹 인터페이스를 신뢰 IP로 제한하고 다시 패치할 것. 출처: https://www.papercut.com/kb/Main/security-bulletin-27-aug-2026-urgent-security-advisory/ https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/papercut-releases-second-emergency-patch-for-exploited-flaws/ • CVE-2026-45321 TanStack 핵심: @tanstack 계열 42개 패키지, 문제 버전 84개 단시간 배포. Tenable FAQ 기준. 왜 중요한가: provenance를 통과한 배포라 서명 검증만으로는 부족. package-lock과 pull_request_target 워크플로를 오늘 대조. 출처: https://www.tenable.com/blog/mini-shai-hulud-frequently-asked-questions https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/08/27/alleged-teampcp-hackers-arrested-australia/ • WordPress GiveWP — CVE-2026-82222 핵심: GiveWP 4.16.7.1 이하. 패치 4.16.7.2 (8/27). 설치 10만+. 왜 중요한가: 워드프레스 기부/후원 페이지면 오늘 4.16.7.2로 올린다. 출처: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/givewp-wordpress-donation-plugin-flaw-lets-hackers-execute-server-commands/ • awsdac Zip Slip — CVE-2026-81838 핵심: 비신뢰 ZipFile 정의 처리 시 캐시 밖 경로 기록. 영향 0.10~0.23. 패치 0.24+. 공식 실악용 언급 없음. 왜 중요한가: CI에서 외부 정의 파일을 쓰면 비신뢰 정의 옵션을 끄고 0.24로 올린다. 출처: https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/2026-090-aws/ —— 개발자·엔터프라이즈 —— • Kubernetes v1.37 핵심: 67개 개선. Pod Certificates, Cluster Trust Bundles, Metrics API Stable. kubectl top, 오토스케일링. 왜 중요한가: 워크로드 신원 발급이 코어로 들어온다. 업그레이드 전 폐기 항목 1건을 먼저 본다. 출처: https://kubernetes.io/blog/2026/08/26/kubernetes-v1-37-release/ https://kubernetes.io/blog/2026/08/28/kubernetes-v1-37-pod-certificates-and-cluster-trust-bundles/ • AWS Transform custom, 지속적 코드 현대화 파이프라인 (8/28) 핵심: GitHub Actions, CodePipeline, Jenkins, GitLab CI에 Transform custom을 넣어 의존성 수정, 문서화, 다중 저장소 변환을 계속 돌리는 패턴. 왜 중요한가: AI 코드 생산이 빨라지며 쌓이는 기술부채를 CI 단계에서 상쇄하려는 운영 패턴이다. 출처: https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/devops/build-your-own-continuous-modernization-pipeline-with-aws-transform-custom/ 패치 큐를 주말 오후에 다시 짜야 한다면, 순서는 NetScaler, PaperCut 2차, TanStack lockfile이다.

    Post summary

    The briefing focuses on patch releases and fixes for several critical CVEs, noting active exploitation for Citrix NetScaler and PaperCut while providing specific technical details and remediation steps.

    100401.3K
    70 followersView on X
  • CCB Alert@CCBalert
    Active Exploitation

    Warning: #CISA added new vulnerabilities to its KEV list: CVE-2026-48027 in #Nx Console, CVE-2026-8398 in #Daemon Tools Lite and CVE-2026-45321 in #Tanstack. Make sure you are running the non-malicious version of the packages to avoid a supply chain attack. #Patch #Patch #Patch

    Post summary

    The tweet warns that three CVEs have been added to CISA’s KEV list, indicating active exploitation, and urges users to ensure they are using the legitimate, non‑malicious versions of the affected packages.

    02011314
    7.2K followersView on X
  • HeroDevs@herodevs
    Disclosure

    TeamPCP compromised 170+ npm/PyPI packages on May 11 — TanStack router, Mistral AI SDKs, UiPath, Guardrails AI. CVE-2026-45321 (CVSS 9.6). Credential stealer targets GitHub tokens, AWS keys, password vaults. Updated payload staged May 13. #SupplyChain #DevSecOps https://thehackernews.com/2026/05/mini-shai-hulud-worm-compromises.html

    Post summary

    The post announces a new vulnerability (CVE‑2026‑45321) with a high severity score, noting compromised packages and credential theft, but it does not provide PoC, exploit code, patches, or evidence of active exploitation.

    10021653
    2.7K followersView on X
  • Cloud Virtues@CloudVirtues
    General

    CVE-2026-45321 - TanStack npm supply chain compromise https://dy.si/fePHF https://t.co/sj8CoNHsQW

    Post summary

    The post simply references CVE‑2026‑45321 as a TanStack npm supply chain issue, with no further actionable or technical details provided.

    0002058
    13 followersView on X
  • University of ZERO@zerotalktoai
    General

    CVE-2026-8398 Daemon Tools Lite Embedded Malicious Code Vulnerability CVE-2026-45321 TanStack Unspecified Vulnerability CVE-2026-48027 Nx Console Embedded Malicious Code Vulnerability

    Post summary

    The snippet merely lists three CVE identifiers with brief titles, lacking details on exploitation, patches, or technical specifics.

    00020152
    1.6K followersView on X
  • DFIR Radar@DFIR_Radar
    Active Exploitation

    Self-propagating worm Mini Shai-Hulud compromises 170+ npm/PyPI packages, defeats SLSA Build Level 3 provenance attestation, and breaches OpenAI and Mistral AI through automated credential theft. Campaign breakdown: • TeamPCP's 4th-generation worm (CVE-2026-45321, CVSS 9.6) steals developer tokens, GitHub PATs, AWS creds, K8s secrets via preinstall hooks • OIDC token extraction from GitHub Actions runner memory enables legitimate pipeline hijacking with valid cryptographic attestations • Cross-ecosystem propagation: npm → PyPI → 518M weekly downloads affected, 400+ GitHub repos compromised • Persistence via gh-token-monitor daemon, .vscode/tasks.json injection, ~/.claude/settings.json hooks • C2 infrastructure: 83.142.209[.]194, getsession[.]org endpoints, GitHub API dead drops with Dune-themed naming Major victims confirmed: • OpenAI: 2 corporate devices, code-signing certificates stolen • Mistral AI 🇫🇷: SDK contamination, repositories for sale on forums • GitHub: 3,800 internal repos breached via trojanized Nx Console VSCode extension • European Commission 🇪🇺: 90GB exfiltrated in earlier Trivy wave Check CI logs for @tanstack/@uipath/@mistralai packages. Remove gh-token-monitor daemons before credential rotation. Monitor for DNS queries to getsession[.]org from CI runners. #DFIR_Radar

    Post summary

    The message reports real‑world attacks from the Mini Shai‑Hulud worm, detailing widespread compromise of npm/PyPI packages and high‑profile victims, with no mention of patches or PoC code.

    10010183
    1.5K followersView on X
  • セキュリティ対策Lab@securityLab_jp
    Disclosure

    TanStackのnpmパッケージ42件にサイバー攻撃でマルウェアが混入、GitHub Actions 経由で認証情報窃取の恐れ(CVE-2026-45321) https://rocket-boys.co.jp/security-measures-lab/tanstack-npm-malware-github-actions-breach/ #セキュリティ対策Lab #security #DataBreach #securitynews

    Post summary

    The headline announces malware injection in 42 TanStack npm packages and potential credential theft via GitHub Actions, citing CVE-2026-45321.

    00020308
    487 followersView on X
  • Marcell Ujlaki@UjlakiMarci
    Active Exploitation

    adding my noise to the internet 🟥 CVE-2026-45321, CVSS: 9.6 (#Critical) TanStack packages. Credential-stealing malware in the npm registry. Attackers exploited a chain of vulnerabilities including pull_request_target misconfiguration, GitHub Actions cache poisoning, and OIDC token extraction. Affected packages include various tanstack/* components. the incident utilized legitimate GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publisher bindings. Users should audit their npm dependencies for malicious versions published on 2026-05-11 and refer to the official security advisory for specific package remediation. #TanStack #npm #CyberSecurity #CVE #Vulnerability https://github.com/TanStack/router/issues/7383

    Post summary

    The post reports that CVE‑2026‑45321 is actively exploited via credential‑stealing malware in the npm registry, highlights specific vulnerability details, and recommends auditing dependencies and following the official advisory for remediation.

    10010136
    353 followersView on X
  • Lyrie.ai@lyrie_ai
    General

    Sources TheHackerWire: CVE-2026-45321 - Critical Vulnerability StepSecurity: Mini Shai-Hulud Self-Spreading Supply Chain Attack Compromises TanStack npm Packages http://Socket.dev: TanStack npm Packages Compromised in Mini Shai-Hulud Supply Chain Attack CVEReports: CVE-2026-45321…

    Post summary

    The provided text lists several sources referencing CVE-2026-45321 but offers no substantive technical or exploit-related details.

    1000048
    295 followersView on X
  • Lyrie.ai@lyrie_ai
    Active Exploitation

    CVE-2026-45321: The Perfect Supply Chain Storm — OIDC Token Theft and 84 Malicious npm Packages. On May 11, 2026, attackers exploited a pullrequesttarget misconfiguration in TanStack's GitHub Actions workflow to steal an OIDC token, poison the build cache across CI/CD…

    Post summary

    The article reports that CVE-2026-45321 was actively exploited on May 11, 2026, via a misconfigured GitHub Actions workflow, enabling attackers to steal OIDC tokens and poison CI/CD build caches.

    1000051
    295 followersView on X
  • Joey Romaine 🇺🇸 |=★=|@Tank23x0
    General

    CVE-2026-45321 is a good patch-discipline check. Affected systems / package compromise. Public details are enough to start scoping. Who owns the affected surface?

    Post summary

    The post merely mentions CVE-2026-45321 as a patch-discipline check, with no additional technical, exploit, or mitigation details.

    1000036
    337 followersView on X
  • Dr. Siraj Dokadia@SirajD_Official
    Disclosure

    CVE-2026-45321 - TanStack npm supply chain compromise https://dy.si/7LAp5d2 https://t.co/iyODBsbhNK

    Post summary

    The tweet discloses CVE-2026-45321, a supply‑chain compromise affecting the TanStack npm package, and directs readers to additional resources via two URLs.

    0001055
    19 followersView on X
  • Lyrie.ai@lyrie_ai
    Active Exploitation

    CVE-2026-45321: TanStack contains an unspecified vulnerability that allowed malicious versions of the product to be published to the npm registry to publish credential-stealing malware under a trusted identity.

    Post summary

    TanStack’s CVE‑2026‑45321 exposes an unspecified flaw that allowed malicious package versions to be published to npm, enabling credential‑stealing malware to run under a trusted identity.

    1000043
    258 followersView on X
CPE platform detail343 entries

343 of 343 entries

PartVendorProductVersionTarget SWTarget HW
Appabhishake1supersurkhet\/cli0.0.2node.js-
Appabhishake1supersurkhet\/cli0.0.3node.js-
Appabhishake1supersurkhet\/cli0.0.4node.js-
Appabhishake1supersurkhet\/cli0.0.5node.js-
Appabhishake1supersurkhet\/cli0.0.6node.js-
Appabhishake1supersurkhet\/cli0.0.7node.js-
Appabhishake1supersurkhet\/sdk0.0.2node.js-
Appabhishake1supersurkhet\/sdk0.0.3node.js-
Appabhishake1supersurkhet\/sdk0.0.4node.js-
Appabhishake1supersurkhet\/sdk0.0.5node.js-
Appabhishake1supersurkhet\/sdk0.0.6node.js-
Appabhishake1supersurkhet\/sdk0.0.7node.js-
Appabhishake1taskflow-corp\/cli0.1.24node.js-
Appabhishake1taskflow-corp\/cli0.1.25node.js-
Appabhishake1taskflow-corp\/cli0.1.26node.js-
Appabhishake1taskflow-corp\/cli0.1.27node.js-
Appabhishake1taskflow-corp\/cli0.1.28node.js-
Appabhishake1taskflow-corp\/cli0.1.29node.js-
Appagentworkhqagentwork-cli0.1.4node.js-
Appagentworkhqagentwork-cli0.1.5node.js-
Appantoinebcxml-toolkit-ts1.0.4node.js-
Appantoinebcxml-toolkit-ts1.0.5node.js-
Appantoinebcxml-toolkit-ts\/preprocessing1.0.2node.js-
Appantoinebcxml-toolkit-ts\/preprocessing1.0.3node.js-
Appantoinebcxml-toolkit-ts\/xgboost1.0.3node.js-
Appantoinebcxml-toolkit-ts\/xgboost1.0.4node.js-
Appbeproductbeproduct\/nestjs-auth0.1.10node.js-
Appbeproductbeproduct\/nestjs-auth0.1.11node.js-
Appbeproductbeproduct\/nestjs-auth0.1.12node.js-
Appbeproductbeproduct\/nestjs-auth0.1.13node.js-
Appbeproductbeproduct\/nestjs-auth0.1.14node.js-
Appbeproductbeproduct\/nestjs-auth0.1.15node.js-
Appbeproductbeproduct\/nestjs-auth0.1.16node.js-
Appbeproductbeproduct\/nestjs-auth0.1.17node.js-
Appbeproductbeproduct\/nestjs-auth0.1.19node.js-
Appbeproductbeproduct\/nestjs-auth0.1.2node.js-
Appbeproductbeproduct\/nestjs-auth0.1.3node.js-
Appbeproductbeproduct\/nestjs-auth0.1.4node.js-
Appbeproductbeproduct\/nestjs-auth0.1.5node.js-
Appbeproductbeproduct\/nestjs-auth0.1.6node.js-
Appbeproductbeproduct\/nestjs-auth0.1.7node.js-
Appbeproductbeproduct\/nestjs-auth0.1.8node.js-
Appbeproductbeproduct\/nestjs-auth0.1.9node.js-
Appchristianalaresgit-git-git1.0.10node.js-
Appchristianalaresgit-git-git1.0.12node.js-
Appchristianalaresgit-git-git1.0.8node.js-
Appchristianalaresgit-git-git1.0.9node.js-
Appchristianalaresgit_branch_selector1.3.3node.js-
Appchristianalaresgit_branch_selector1.3.4node.js-
Appchristianalaresgit_branch_selector1.3.5node.js-
Appchristianalaresgit_branch_selector1.3.7node.js-
Appchristianalaresnextmove-mcp0.1.3node.js-
Appchristianalaresnextmove-mcp0.1.4node.js-
Appchristianalaresnextmove-mcp0.1.5node.js-
Appchristianalaresnextmove-mcp0.1.7node.js-
Appchristianalarestolka\/cli1.0.2node.js-
Appchristianalarestolka\/cli1.0.3node.js-
Appchristianalarestolka\/cli1.0.4node.js-
Appchristianalarestolka\/cli1.0.6node.js-
Appdirigibledirigible-ai\/sdk0.6.2node.js-
Appdirigibledirigible-ai\/sdk0.6.3node.js-
Appguardrailsaiguardrails_ai0.10.1python-
Appkilbottallyui\/components1.0.1node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/components1.0.2node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/components1.0.3node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/connector-medusa1.0.1node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/connector-medusa1.0.2node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/connector-medusa1.0.3node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/connector-shopify1.0.1node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/connector-shopify1.0.2node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/connector-shopify1.0.3node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/connector-vendure1.0.1node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/connector-vendure1.0.2node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/connector-vendure1.0.3node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/connector-woocommerce1.0.1node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/connector-woocommerce1.0.2node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/connector-woocommerce1.0.3node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/core0.2.1node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/core0.2.2node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/core0.2.3node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/database1.0.1node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/database1.0.2node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/database1.0.3node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/pos0.1.1node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/pos0.1.2node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/pos0.1.3node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/storage-sqlite0.2.1node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/storage-sqlite0.2.2node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/storage-sqlite0.2.3node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/theme0.2.1node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/theme0.2.2node.js-
Appkilbottallyui\/theme0.2.3node.js-
Applinuxfoundationopensearch3.6.2node.js-
Appmatheuspergolidraftauth\/client0.2.1node.js-
Appmatheuspergolidraftauth\/client0.2.2node.js-
Appmatheuspergolidraftauth\/core0.13.1node.js-
Appmatheuspergolidraftauth\/core0.13.2node.js-
Appmatheuspergolidraftlab\/auth0.24.1node.js-
Appmatheuspergolidraftlab\/auth0.24.2node.js-
Appmatheuspergolidraftlab\/auth-router0.5.1node.js-
Appmatheuspergolidraftlab\/auth-router0.5.2node.js-
Appmatheuspergolidraftlab\/db0.16.1node.js-
Appmatheuspergolidraftlab\/db0.16.2node.js-
Appmatheuspergolisimple_type-safe_actions0.8.3node.js-
Appmatheuspergolisimple_type-safe_actions0.8.4node.js-
Appmesamesadev\/rest0.28.3node.js-
Appmesamesadev\/saguaro0.4.22node.js-
Appmesamesadev\/sdk0.28.3node.js-
Appmistralmistralai2.4.6python-
Appmistralmistralai\/mistralai2.2.3node.js-
Appmistralmistralai\/mistralai2.2.4node.js-
Appmistralmistralai\/mistralai-azure1.7.2node.js-
Appmistralmistralai\/mistralai-azure1.7.3node.js-
Appmistralmistralai\/mistralai-gcp1.7.2node.js-
Appmistralmistralai\/mistralai-gcp1.7.3node.js-
Appmultiagentcognitioncmux-agent-mcp0.1.3node.js-
Appmultiagentcognitioncmux-agent-mcp0.1.4node.js-
Appmultiagentcognitioncmux-agent-mcp0.1.5node.js-
Appmultiagentcognitioncmux-agent-mcp0.1.6node.js-
Appmultiagentcognitioncmux-agent-mcp0.1.7node.js-
Appmultiagentcognitioncmux-agent-mcp0.1.8node.js-
Appneilcochrancross-stitch1.1.3node.js-
Appneilcochrancross-stitch1.1.4node.js-
Appneilcochrancross-stitch1.1.6node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/airports0.6.2node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/airports0.6.3node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/airports0.6.5node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/airspace0.8.1node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/airspace0.8.2node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/airspace0.8.4node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/airspace-data0.5.3node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/airspace-data0.5.4node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/airspace-data0.5.6node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/airway-data0.5.4node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/airway-data0.5.5node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/airway-data0.5.7node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/airways0.4.2node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/airways0.4.3node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/airways0.4.5node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/fix-data0.6.4node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/fix-data0.6.5node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/fix-data0.6.7node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/fixes0.3.2node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/fixes0.3.3node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/fixes0.3.5node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/flight-math0.5.4node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/flight-math0.5.5node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/flight-math0.5.7node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/flightplan0.5.2node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/flightplan0.5.3node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/flightplan0.5.5node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/geo0.4.4node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/geo0.4.5node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/geo0.4.7node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/icao-registry0.5.2node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/icao-registry0.5.3node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/icao-registry0.5.5node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/icao-registry-data0.8.4node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/icao-registry-data0.8.5node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/icao-registry-data0.8.7node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/mcp0.9.1node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/mcp0.9.2node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/mcp0.9.4node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/navaid-data0.6.4node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/navaid-data0.6.5node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/navaid-data0.6.7node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/navaids0.4.2node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/navaids0.4.3node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/navaids0.4.5node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/notams0.3.6node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/notams0.3.7node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/notams0.3.9node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/procedure-data0.7.3node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/procedure-data0.7.4node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/procedure-data0.7.6node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/procedures0.5.2node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/procedures0.5.3node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/procedures0.5.5node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/types0.8.1node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/types0.8.2node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/types0.8.4node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/units0.4.3node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/units0.4.4node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/units0.4.6node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/weather0.5.6node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/weather0.5.7node.js-
Appneilcochransquawk\/weather0.5.9node.js-
Appneilcochrants-dna3.0.1node.js-
Appneilcochrants-dna3.0.2node.js-
Appneilcochrants-dna3.0.4node.js-
Appneilcochranwot-api0.8.1node.js-
Appneilcochranwot-api0.8.2node.js-
Appneilcochranwot-api0.8.4node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/arktype-adapter1.166.12node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/arktype-adapter1.166.15node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/eslint-plugin-router1.161.12node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/eslint-plugin-router1.161.9node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/eslint-plugin-start0.0.4node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/eslint-plugin-start0.0.7node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/history1.161.12node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/history1.161.9node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/nitro-v2-vite-plugin1.154.12node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/nitro-v2-vite-plugin1.154.15node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/react-router1.169.5node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/react-router1.169.8node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/react-router-devtools1.166.16node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/react-router-devtools1.166.19node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/react-router-ssr-query1.166.15node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/react-router-ssr-query1.166.18node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/react-start1.167.68node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/react-start1.167.71node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/react-start-client1.166.51node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/react-start-client1.166.54node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/react-start-rsc0.0.47node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/react-start-rsc0.0.50node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/react-start-server1.166.55node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/react-start-server1.166.58node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/router-cli1.166.46node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/router-cli1.166.49node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/router-core1.169.5node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/router-core1.169.8node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/router-devtools1.166.16node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/router-devtools1.166.19node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/router-devtools-core1.167.6node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/router-devtools-core1.167.9node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/router-generator1.166.45node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/router-generator1.166.48node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/router-plugin1.167.38node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/router-plugin1.167.41node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/router-ssr-query-core1.168.3node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/router-ssr-query-core1.168.6node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/router-utils1.161.11node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/router-utils1.161.14node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/router-vite-plugin1.166.53node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/router-vite-plugin1.166.56node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/solid-router1.169.5node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/solid-router1.169.8node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/solid-router-devtools1.166.16node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/solid-router-devtools1.166.19node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/solid-router-ssr-query1.166.15node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/solid-router-ssr-query1.166.18node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/solid-start1.167.65node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/solid-start1.167.68node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/solid-start-client1.166.50node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/solid-start-client1.166.53node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/solid-start-server1.166.54node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/solid-start-server1.166.57node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/start-client-core1.168.5node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/start-client-core1.168.8node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/start-fn-stubs1.161.12node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/start-fn-stubs1.161.9node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/start-plugin-core1.169.23node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/start-plugin-core1.169.26node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/start-server-core1.167.33node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/start-server-core1.167.36node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/start-static-server-functions1.166.44node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/start-static-server-functions1.166.47node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/start-storage-context1.166.38node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/start-storage-context1.166.41node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/valibot-adapter1.166.12node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/valibot-adapter1.166.15node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/virtual-file-routes1.161.10node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/virtual-file-routes1.161.13node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/vue-router1.169.5node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/vue-router1.169.8node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/vue-router-devtools1.166.16node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/vue-router-devtools1.166.19node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/vue-router-ssr-query1.166.15node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/vue-router-ssr-query1.166.18node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/vue-start1.167.61node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/vue-start1.167.64node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/vue-start-client1.166.46node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/vue-start-client1.166.49node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/vue-start-server1.166.50node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/vue-start-server1.166.53node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/zod-adapter1.166.12node.js-
Apptanstacktanstack\/zod-adapter1.166.15node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/access-policy-sdk0.3.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/access-policy-tool0.3.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/admin-tool0.1.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/agent-sdk1.0.2node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/agent-tool1.0.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/agent.sdk0.0.18node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/aops-policy-tool0.3.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/ap-chat1.5.7node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/api-workflow-tool1.0.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/apollo-core5.9.2node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/apollo-react4.24.5node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/apollo-wind2.16.2node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/auth1.0.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/case-tool1.0.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/cli1.0.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/codedagent-tool1.0.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/codedagents-tool0.1.12node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/codedapp-tool1.0.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/common1.0.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/context-grounding-tool0.1.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/data-fabric-tool1.0.2node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/docsai-tool1.0.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/filesystem1.0.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/flow-tool1.0.2node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/functions-tool1.0.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/gov-tool0.3.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/identity-tool0.1.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/insights-sdk1.0.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/insights-tool1.0.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/integrationservice-sdk1.0.2node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/integrationservice-tool1.0.2node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/llmgw-tool1.0.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/maestro-sdk1.0.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/maestro-tool1.0.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/orchestrator-tool1.0.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/packager-tool-apiworkflow0.0.19node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/packager-tool-bpmn0.0.9node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/packager-tool-case0.0.9node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/packager-tool-connector0.0.19node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/packager-tool-flow0.0.19node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/packager-tool-functions0.1.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/packager-tool-webapp1.0.6node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/packager-tool-workflowcompiler0.0.16node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/packager-tool-workflowcompiler-browser0.0.34node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/platform-tool1.0.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/project-packager1.1.16node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/resource-tool1.0.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/resourcecatalog-tool0.1.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/resources-tool0.1.11node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/robot1.3.4node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/rpa-legacy-tool1.0.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/rpa-tool0.9.5node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/solution-packager0.0.35node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/solution-tool1.0.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/solutionpackager-sdk1.0.11node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/solutionpackager-tool-core0.0.34node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/tasks-tool1.0.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/telemetry0.0.7node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/test-manager-tool1.0.2node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/tool-workflowcompiler0.0.12node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/traces-tool1.0.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/ui-widgets-multi-file-upload1.0.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/uipath-python-bridge1.0.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/vertical-solutions-tool1.0.1node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/vss0.1.6node.js-
Appuipathuipath\/widget.sdk1.2.3node.js-

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