CVE-2026-48205PoC(apache / camel)

LOWCVSS 9.1 · CRITICAL

Exploit discussion active in current signal (1 latest mentions)

Immediate actions

  • Prioritize remediation for apache camel systems immediately
  • Hunt for exploitation attempts and persistence artifacts
  • Increase monitoring for publicly documented tradecraft
  • Track advisory updates for patch or workaround availability

Recommended action window: High priority (within 72h)

NVD description

Improper Input Validation, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Apache Camel DNS component. The camel-dns producers read DNS operation parameters - the resolver to query, the name or domain to look up, the record type and class, and the search term - from Exchange message headers whose constant values (DnsConstants.DNS_SERVER, DNS_NAME, DNS_DOMAIN, DNS_TYPE, DNS_CLASS, TERM) were the plain strings dns.server, dns.name, dns.domain, dns.type, dns.class and term. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into a dns: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set the dns.server header to make the dig producer build a SimpleResolver pointing at an attacker-controlled DNS server - a server-side request forgery via DNS, through which the attacker observes the queried name and can return poisoned responses - and set the dns.name / dns.domain headers to resolve arbitrary internal hostnames, disclosing whether they exist (internal network reconnaissance). No credentials are required when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that drive DNS operations via the raw header names must use CamelDnsServer / CamelDnsName / CamelDnsDomain / CamelDnsType / CamelDnsClass / CamelDnsTerm instead of the dns.* / term names. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the dns.* and term headers from any untrusted ingress before the dns: producer, and set the DNS server and lookup parameters from a trusted source in the route.

3.5/ 10 priority

Sources & remediation

Weakness type (CWE)
CWE-20CWE-918

Priority

LOW

Exploitation

NONE

PoC

YES

Patch

NONE

Momentum

NONE

Are you affected?

If you run products in this scope, you should treat this CVE as relevant to your environment.

  • camel

Threat summary

  • Public PoC and exploit tooling are both present
  • 1 mentions across 1 observed day

What's happening

  • Exploit tool or code specified in 1 signal
  • PoC mentioned or linked in 1 signal
  • Technical details provided in 1 signal
  • 1 total mentions across 1 day

Affected systems

Vendors
Products
camel

Deep dive

Activity timeline1 mentions / 1d
00111Mentions · 2026-07-20: 1PoC Mentioned / Linked · 2026-07-20: 1Exploit Tool / Code · 2026-07-20: 1Technical Details · 2026-07-20: 107-20
Signal classification1 categories
PoC
1100.0%
Referenced assets3 URLs
Full discourse1 post
  • dbugs@ptdbugs
    PoC

    A PoC/exploit has been discovered for vulnerability CVE-2026-48205 PT ID: PT-2026-55901 Vendor: Apache Software Foundation Product: Apache Camel DNS Description: Improper Input Validation, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Apache Camel DNS component. The camel-dns producers read DNS operation parameters - the resolver to query, the name or domain to look up, the record type and class, and the search term - from Exchange message headers whose constant values (DnsConstants.DNS_SERVER, DNS_NAME, DNS_DOMAIN, DNS_TYPE, DNS_CLASS, TERM) were the plain strings dns.server, http://dns.name, dns.domain, dns.type, dns.class and term. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into a dns: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set the dns.server header to make the dig producer build a SimpleResolver pointing at an attacker-controlled DNS server - a server-side request forgery via DNS, through which the attacker observes the queried name and can return poisoned responses - and set the http://dns.name / dns.domain headers to resolve arbitrary internal hostnames, disclosing whether they exist (internal network reconnaissance). No credentials are required when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. References: • https://dbugs.ptsecurity.com/vulnerability/PT-2026-55901 • https://github.com/oscerd/cve-2026-48205 #dbugs_vuln

    Post summary

    A PoC/exploit for CVE‑2026‑48205—an SSRF vulnerability in Apache Camel DNS—has been discovered, detailing the attack vector and providing code references, though there is no evidence of active exploitation or patching.

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CPE platform detail1 entries

1 of 1 entries

PartVendorProductVersionTarget SWTarget HW
Appapachecamel---

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