CVE-2026-48682Patch

LOWCVSS 5.9 · MEDIUM

Exploit discussion active in current signal (1 latest mentions)

Immediate actions

  • Patch affected systems immediately
  • Hunt for exploitation attempts and persistence artifacts
  • Increase monitoring for publicly documented tradecraft

Recommended action window: High priority (within 72h)

NVD description

FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an out-of-bounds read in the IPv4 packet parser. In src/simple_packet_parser_ng.cpp, after validating that the packet contains at least sizeof(ipv4_header_t) bytes (20 bytes), the code advances the local_pointer by '4 * ipv4_header->get_ihl()' (line 164) without validating that (a) IHL >= 5 (the minimum valid value per RFC 791), or (b) 4 * IHL bytes are actually available in the packet. The IHL field is 4 bits, allowing values 0-15, so the advance can be 0-60 bytes. An IHL value of 15 with only 20 bytes validated causes a 40-byte over-read. An IHL of 0-4 causes the pointer to not advance past the IP header, resulting in the TCP/UDP header being parsed from IP header data (type confusion). This vulnerability is reachable via any packet capture interface.

2.0/ 10 priority

Sources & remediation

Weakness type (CWE)
CWE-125

Priority

LOW

Exploitation

NONE

PoC

YES

Patch

AVAILABLE

Momentum

NONE

Threat summary

  • Public PoC is present in monitored signal
  • Patch or workaround signal is available
  • 1 mentions across 1 observed day

What's happening

  • PoC mentioned or linked in 1 signal
  • Patch or workaround mentioned in 1 signal
  • Technical details provided in 1 signal
  • 1 total mentions across 1 day

Deep dive

Activity timeline1 mentions / 1d
00111Mentions · 2026-06-03: 1PoC Mentioned / Linked · 2026-06-03: 1Patch / Workaround · 2026-06-03: 1Technical Details · 2026-06-03: 106-03
Signal classification1 categories
Patch
1100.0%
Referenced assets16 URLs
Full discourse1 post
  • Lorikeet Security@lorikeetsec
    Patch

    16 CVEs in FastNetMon Community Edition. All found, reported, and fixed. Our team ran a full source code audit of FastNetMon CE and surfaced 16 distinct vulnerabilities, now tracked as CVE-2026-48682 through CVE-2026-48697. First, credit where it is due. Huge thanks to Pavel Odintsov and the FastNetMon team. We sent the report and they moved immediately, confirmed the issues, staged fixes, and shipped patches in days. That is exactly how responsible disclosure is supposed to go, and a maintainer who turns it around that fast makes the whole ecosystem safer. The part I am most excited about: we did not find these by hand alone. Much of this audit ran on the same analysis engine we are building into Lory, our autonomous offensive security agent. The pattern that caught most of the worst bugs is simple to describe and brutal in practice, a length value read straight off the wire flowing into a memcpy with no bounds check. Teaching an agent to trace untrusted input from the network boundary to the dangerous sink is exactly what Lory is built to do at scale. FastNetMon was a real-world proving ground, and it delivered. The throughline on the critical ones: wire-controlled length, no validation, into a binary built with zero hardening flags. No stack canary, no FORTIFY, no PIE, no RELRO. That is what turns a parser bug into code execution as root on the box watching your network. If you run FastNetMon CE in production, update now. If you package it yourself, add hardening flags to your build. → All 16, with full technical writeups: Memory corruption CVE-2026-48682 · IPv4 parser OOB read https://lorikeetsecurity.com/blog/fastnetmon-cve-2026-48682-ipv4-parser-oob CVE-2026-48683 · NetFlow v9 data flowset OOB https://lorikeetsecurity.com/blog/fastnetmon-cve-2026-48683-netflow-v9-data-oob CVE-2026-48684 · NetFlow v9 options template OOB https://lorikeetsecurity.com/blog/fastnetmon-cve-2026-48684-netflow-v9-options-oob CVE-2026-48685 · BGP extended length misread https://lorikeetsecurity.com/blog/fastnetmon-cve-2026-48685-bgp-extended-length CVE-2026-48686 · BGP NLRI stack overflow (CVSS 9.8, RCE) https://lorikeetsecurity.com/blog/fastnetmon-cve-2026-48686-bgp-nlri-stack-overflow CVE-2026-48688 · BGP MP_REACH_NLRI IPv6 https://lorikeetsecurity.com/blog/fastnetmon-cve-2026-48688-bgp-mp-reach-nlri-ipv6 CVE-2026-48689 · Dynamic buffer off-by-one https://lorikeetsecurity.com/blog/fastnetmon-cve-2026-48689-dynamic-buffer-off-by-one CVE-2026-48690 · Packet storage integer overflow https://lorikeetsecurity.com/blog/fastnetmon-cve-2026-48690-packet-storage-integer-overflow CVE-2026-48691 · BGP AS_PATH overflow https://lorikeetsecurity.com/blog/fastnetmon-cve-2026-48691-bgp-as-path-overflow Injection CVE-2026-48687 · Juniper plugin command injection https://lorikeetsecurity.com/blog/fastnetmon-cve-2026-48687-juniper-cmd-injection CVE-2026-48694 · Juniper NETCONF injection https://lorikeetsecurity.com/blog/fastnetmon-cve-2026-48694-juniper-netconf-injection CVE-2026-48695 · MikroTik command injection https://lorikeetsecurity.com/blog/fastnetmon-cve-2026-48695-mikrotik-cmd-injection CVE-2026-48696 · ExaBGP sprintf overflow https://lorikeetsecurity.com/blog/fastnetmon-cve-2026-48696-exabgp-sprintf-overflow Auth & transport CVE-2026-48692 · Unauthenticated gRPC interface https://lorikeetsecurity.com/blog/fastnetmon-cve-2026-48692-grpc-no-auth CVE-2026-48693 · Symlink issue in temp handling https://lorikeetsecurity.com/blog/fastnetmon-cve-2026-48693-symlink-tmp CVE-2026-48697 · Missing TLS validation https://lorikeetsecurity.com/blog/fastnetmon-cve-2026-48697-missing-tls-validation → Read the C, find the line, prove the impact, disclose it right. #cybersecurity #infosec #vulnerabilityresearch #CVE #networksecurity #BGP #responsibledisclosure #AISecurity

    Post summary

    FastNetMon Community Edition released 16 CVEs with publicly available proofs of concept and confirmed patches, urging immediate update and stronger hardening for production deployments.

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