Signal is active with 1 mentions in latest observed window
Recommended action window: Monitor and triage in normal cycle
NVD description
Relyra is a strict-by-default SAML 2.0 Service Provider library for Elixir and Phoenix. Versions 1.0.0 and 1.1.0 accept forged SAML signatures because SignatureValue was not cryptographically verified before the library returned a successful authentication result. The XMLDSig trust boundary was incomplete as :public_key.verify over the exclusive-C14N canonicalized SignedInfo was not performed against the configured IdP certificate's public key, DigestValue was not recomputed over the canonicalized referenced element, and canonicalize/2 remained an unused passthrough in the signature-verification path. The result was a structure-only acceptance path where document shape and trust-source rejection could succeed without proving the signature bytes. A forged SignatureValue carrying an attacker-controlled NameID could be accepted as {:ok}. This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.0.
Priority
LOW
Exploitation
NONE
PoC
NONE
Patch
NONE
Momentum
STABLE
Another reminder that trust is earned, not assumed. CVE-2026-49454. Relyra SAML SignatureValue not cryptographically verified -> authentication bypass The best defense is the one you set up before you needed it.
Post summary
The post announces CVE-2026-49454, describing an authentication bypass due to Relyra SAML SignatureValue not being cryptographically verified, emphasizing the need for proactive defenses.
🔴 Relyra (Elixir/Phoenix), SAML Authentication Bypass, #CVE-2026-49454 (CRITICAL) -DC-Jun2026-697 https://dailycve.com/relyra-elixir-phoenix-saml-authentication-bypass-cve-2026-49454-critical-dc-jun2026-697/
Post summary
A new critical CVE-2026-49454 for Relyra's SAML authentication bypass is announced; a link to DailyCVE provides additional details.