CVE-2026-55607Disclosure(anthropic / claude_code)

MEDIUMCVSS 8.8 · HIGH

Exploit discussion active in current signal (1 latest mentions)

Immediate actions

  • Patch anthropic claude_code systems immediately
  • Hunt for exploitation attempts and persistence artifacts
  • Increase monitoring for publicly documented tradecraft

Recommended action window: High priority (within 72h)

NVD description

Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. From 2.1.38 until 2.1.163, Claude Code's worktree handling allowed creation of worktrees named ".git" and navigation to worktrees outside the sandbox context, enabling git directory confusion attacks. By exploiting symlink manipulation and git fsmonitor execution during worktree operations, an attacker could overwrite files in the user's home directory (such as .zshenv), leading to code execution outside of seatbelt sandbox restrictions. Reliably exploiting this required the user to clone a malicious repository containing prompt injection content and run Claude Code against it. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.1.163.

4.3/ 10 priority

Sources & remediation

Weakness type (CWE)
CWE-22CWE-59CWE-78

Priority

MEDIUM

Exploitation

NONE

PoC

YES

Patch

AVAILABLE

Momentum

STABLE

Are you affected?

If you run products in this scope, you should treat this CVE as relevant to your environment.

  • claude_code

Threat summary

  • Public PoC and exploit tooling are both present
  • Patch or workaround signal is available
  • 13 mentions across 8 observed days
  • Momentum state: stable

What's happening

  • Exploit tool or code specified in 5 signals
  • PoC mentioned or linked in 6 signals
  • Patch or workaround mentioned in 5 signals
  • Technical details provided in 11 signals
  • Disclosure: 6 classified signals
  • Peaked 7d ago at 2 mentions (2026-06-26); latest day: 1
  • 13 total mentions across 8 days

Affected systems

Vendors
Products
claude_code

Deep dive

Activity timeline13 mentions / 8d
01122Mentions · 2026-06-26: 2Mentions · 2026-06-28: 1Mentions · 2026-06-29: 2Mentions · 2026-07-08: 2Mentions · 2026-07-09: 2Mentions · 2026-07-10: 2Mentions · 2026-07-14: 1Mentions · 2026-09-07: 1PoC Mentioned / Linked · 2026-06-26: 1PoC Mentioned / Linked · 2026-06-28: 1PoC Mentioned / Linked · 2026-07-08: 2PoC Mentioned / Linked · 2026-07-09: 1PoC Mentioned / Linked · 2026-07-10: 1Exploit Tool / Code · 2026-06-26: 1Exploit Tool / Code · 2026-07-08: 2Exploit Tool / Code · 2026-07-09: 1Exploit Tool / Code · 2026-07-10: 1Patch / Workaround · 2026-06-26: 1Patch / Workaround · 2026-06-28: 1Patch / Workaround · 2026-07-08: 2Patch / Workaround · 2026-07-10: 1Technical Details · 2026-06-26: 2Technical Details · 2026-06-28: 1Technical Details · 2026-06-29: 2Technical Details · 2026-07-08: 2Technical Details · 2026-07-09: 2Technical Details · 2026-07-10: 1Technical Details · 2026-07-14: 106-2606-2806-2907-0807-0907-1007-1409-07
Signal classification4 categories
Disclosure
646.2%
PoC
430.8%
Exploit
215.4%
General
17.7%
Referenced assets11 URLs
Classification over time
DateTotalLabels
2026-06-262
Exploit1PoC1
2026-06-281
PoC1
2026-06-292
Disclosure1General1
2026-07-082
Disclosure1PoC1
2026-07-092
Disclosure1PoC1
2026-07-102
Disclosure1Exploit1
2026-07-141
Disclosure1
2026-09-071
Disclosure1
Full discourse13 posts
  • metnew@v_metnew
    PoC

    Claude Code Full Sandbox Escape (CVE-2026-55607) writeup: https://github.com/Metnew/write-ups/tree/main/claude-code-worktree-sandbox-escape#human-written-super-tldr-summary-of-the-bug prompt injection -> code execution on the host. works even in read-only permissions mode + full sandbox (it could be my Pwn2Own bug, but p2o was weird this year lol) https://t.co/UOjXsQ3O5n

    Post summary

    The tweet references CVE‑2026‑55607, linking to a write‑up that includes a proof of concept for a sandbox escape via prompt injection, but it does not report a public exploit, patch, or active exploitation.

    26196131.1K812101.5K
    3.9K followersView on X
  • N45HT@N45HTOfficial
    PoC

    $3,700 Anthropic Bug Bounty 🤑 [CVE-2026-55607] Claude Code: unsandboxed code execution from prompt injection via .git worktree confusion by Metnew 🤯🔥 👨‍💻 Metnew (x/v_metnew) 🔗 https://github.com/Metnew/write-ups/tree/main/claude-code-worktree-sandbox-escape 🔗 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55607 🔗 https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/security/advisories/GHSA-7835-87q9-rgvv https://t.co/aaQqXSGcy0

    Post summary

    A write‑up for CVE‑2026‑55607 outlines unsandboxed code execution via .git worktree confusion, includes a PoC and vendor advisory, and is supported by a $3,700 Anthropic bug bounty.

    277249432339.6K
    676 followersView on X
  • Md Ismail Šojal 🕷️@0x0SojalSec
    Exploit

    $3,700 Anthropic bounty for breaking Claude Code’s sandbox with one clever .git trick CVE-2026-55607 High (CVSS 7.7) Claude Code allowed creation of worktrees named .git. Combined with: - Symlink following in worktree tools - Git fsmonitor hook execution - zsh sourcing ~/.zshenv before seatbelt sandbox Full unsandboxed RCE via prompt injection. This is next-level: Prompt injection on .git worktree confusion symlink to $HOME to write to ~/.zshenv before sandbox kicks in. If you’re using Claude Code, update to v2.1.163 right now. https://x.com/N45HTOfficial/status/2074874112548507852/video/1

    Post summary

    CVE‑2026‑55607 enables unsandboxed RCE in Claude Code through .git worktree manipulation; Anthropic offered a $3,700 bounty and recommends patching to v2.1.163.

    3180143789.8K
    54.4K followersView on X
  • NullSecurityX@NullSecurityX
    PoC

    Claude Code: unsandboxed code execution from prompt injection via .git worktree confusion by Metnew CVE-2026-55607 https://www.youtube.com/@NullSecurityX Github: https://github.com/Metnew/write-ups/tree/main/claude-code-worktree-sandbox-escape https://t.co/JhQq5YlbC5

    Post summary

    The post announces CVE‑2026‑55607, highlighting unsandboxed code execution via prompt injection and provides a GitHub repository that hosts a PoC exploit.

    116089537.1K
    12.3K followersView on X
  • QCXINT@QCXINT_
    Disclosure

    🚨 Claude Code vulnerability earns a $3,700 bug bounty. A new vulnerability (CVE-2026-55607) shows how prompt injection combined with ".git" worktree confusion could lead to unsandboxed code execution. The issue has already been patched by Anthropic. If you're building AI coding agents or autonomous developer tools... this write-up is worth studying to better understand the security risks around agent execution and prompt injection. Research: https://github.com/Metnew/write-ups/tree/main/claude-code-worktree-sandbox-escape CVE: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55607 Anthropic Security Advisory: https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/security/advisories/GHSA-7835-87q9-rgvv

    Post summary

    A newly disclosed vulnerability (CVE-2026-55607) in Claude Code allows unsandboxed code execution via prompt injection and .git worktree confusion, has a public PoC in a GitHub write‑up, and has already been patched by Anthropic.

    060203511.0K
    1.8K followersView on X
  • Md Ismail Šojal 🕷️@0x0SojalSec
    Disclosure

    A High-severity sandbox escape (CVE-2026-55607) - http://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/security/advisories/GHSA-7835-87q9-rgvv - http://github.com/Metnew/write-ups/tree/main/claude-code-worktree-sandbox-escape

    Post summary

    The text announces CVE‑2026‑55607, a high‑severity sandbox escape, and provides links to a GitHub advisory and a write‑up, but offers no exploitation code, patch details, or evidence of active abuse.

    00033716
    54.4K followersView on X
  • Aircorridor@_aircorridor
    Disclosure

    Code Execution Vulnerability in Claude Code by Anthropics CVE-2026-55607 | Severity: HIGH https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/security/advisories/GHSA-7835-87q9-rgvv

    Post summary

    The post announces a high‑severity code execution vulnerability (CVE‑2026‑55607) in Claude Code, referencing a GitHub security advisory for further details.

    01022421
    13.6K followersView on X
  • Tochukwu Okonkwor@tokonkwor
    Disclosure

    Affected agents named in the disclosure: Claude Code, OpenAI Codex, Cursor, Goose, Nous Hermes Agent, Qwen Code, and xAI Grok Build. CVEs assigned include CVE-2026-71963 and CVE-2026-55607.

    Post summary

    The text announces two new CVEs, CVE-2026-71963 and CVE-2026-55607, affecting several AI agents in a formal disclosure.

    1001083
    25 followersView on X
  • クロニキ|Claude Code専門家@chroniki_ai
    Disclosure

    今回発見された脆弱性(CVE-2026-55607)は何が問題だったのか。 専門用語を噛み砕くとこういう話です: ❌ 問題のある状態 Claude Codeは「.git」という名前のworktree(作業フォルダの分身)を作れてしまった。攻撃者がここに悪意ある指示を仕込む(=プロンプトインジェクション)と... ⭕ 何が起きるか Claude Codeがサンドボックス(安全な箱)の外でコードを実行してしまう。本来触れてはいけないシステムのファイルにまで手が届く状態に。 → 「Claude Codeが何かしてくれる」を悪用した攻撃です。

    Post summary

    The post describes the technical details of CVE-2026‑55607, noting that a prompt‑injection in Claude Code can create a malicious .git worktree, leading to sandbox escape and unauthorized system file access.

    10000507
    936 followersView on X
  • Prasenjit Sarkar@stretchcloud
    Exploit

    The attack surface for agentic coding tools just got a proper name: CVE-2026-55607. Claude Code's worktree handling let an attacker name a worktree ".git" and navigate it outside the sandbox context. From there: symlink manipulation plus git fsmonitor execution rewrites ~/.zshenv and you have code execution on the host. Works in read-only permissions mode. Works with the full sandbox on. The entry point is a malicious repo with embedded prompt injection. Clone it, point Claude Code at it, and the rest runs itself. This is the third distinct Claude Code sandbox escape class in 2026. The network allowlist bypass (May 2026) let agents exfiltrate data via protocol manipulation. CVE-2026-25725 used settings.json config injection to persist across sessions. Now the worktree path confusion vector that reaches the host even when you thought the sandbox was airtight. The pattern I keep seeing: the attack surface for coding agents is not the model. It's the filesystem and shell integrations that make agents useful in the first place. Read-only mode, sandboxing, allowlists, none of these form a hard boundary when the tooling around code execution is complex enough. Cursor, Windsurf, Cody, Devin, every tool that wraps an LLM with shell access faces the same structural problem. The boundary between "agent reads files" and "agent runs code" is thinner than any of the sandboxes suggest. The current fix: auto-update. Long-term, the missing piece is deterministic file access auditing at the kernel level, not trust in the agent's own sandbox logic. https://x.com/v_metnew/status/2070369295704482296

    Post summary

    The tweet explains a sandbox escape via worktree path confusion with detailed exploitation steps, notes an auto‑update fix, and highlights that no active attacks are reported.

    00001158
    2.3K followersView on X
  • Infoflowcloud@infoflowcloud
    General

    🚨*CVE* CVE-2026-55607 Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. From 2.1.38 until 2.1.163, Claude Code's worktree handling allowed creation of worktrees named ".git" and navigation to worktr… https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-55607 ----- Traducción: CVE-2026-55607 Cla… http://infoflow.cloud`

    Post summary

    The text references CVE-2026-55607, providing limited technical details and a link, but offers no evidence of exploitation, patches, or PoCs.

    0000039
    89 followersView on X
  • CVE@CVEnew
    Disclosure

    CVE-2026-55607 Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. From 2.1.38 until 2.1.163, Claude Code's worktree handling allowed creation of worktrees named ".git" and navigation to worktr… https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-55607

    Post summary

    The post discloses a flaw in Claude Code versions 2.1.38–2.1.163 that permits creation of a ".git" worktree and navigation to it, potentially exposing repository data. No PoC, exploit, or patch is referenced.

    00000776
    57.7K followersView on X
  • Bryan@so_sthbryan
    PoC

    Claude Code has a full sandbox escape even with read-only permissions. CVE-2026-55607: - Prompt injection to host code execution - Works even with full sandbox and read-only mode - PoC writeup live on GitHub If you run Claude Code with YOLO mode, patch now. https://github.com/Metnew/write-ups/tree/main/claude-code-worktree-sandbox-escape

    Post summary

    The post announces CVE‑2026‑55607, provides a link to a GitHub PoC, includes technical details of the sandbox escape, and urges users to patch to mitigate the risk.

    0000094
    98 followersView on X
CPE platform detail1 entries

1 of 1 entries

PartVendorProductVersionTarget SWTarget HW
Appanthropicclaude_code-node.js-

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