
CVE-2026-57219 allows an unauthenticated attacker who can reach the management port (commonly 15672) to retrieve the broker’s confidential OAuth client secret through the obsolete GET /api/auth endpoint. The root cause sits in two functions: is_authorized/2 is hard-coded to always return true for this path, and produce_auth_settings/2 copies the oauth_client_secret value directly into the JSON response. Once the attacker possesses the secret, they can exchange it at the configured identity provider for an administrative token and assume full control over messages, queues, users, virtual hosts, and broker configuration. The attack sequence is straightforward once the management port is reachable. The attacker issues the unauthenticated GET, receives the secret in the JSON body, and immediately presents that secret to the identity provider in a standard OAuth client-credentials flow. The resulting token carries the broker’s own administrative scope. From that point the attacker can create or delete queues, publish or consume messages at will, enumerate and modify users and permissions, and alter virtual-host configuration without ever authenticating as a legitimate application or user. The vulnerability affects RabbitMQ versions 3.13.0 and later when the management plugin is enabled and OAuth is configured with a confidential client secret. It does not affect deployments that use no OAuth secret at all or that run without the management plugin. Public clients and PKCE flows that never store a client secret are unaffected because there is nothing to leak. CVE-2026-57221 lets any authenticated user, even one with zero explicit permissions, enumerate queues and exchanges and read operational statistics. The flaw is missing authorization checks on passive-declare operations inside the management API. The issue does not expose message contents or permit modification, yet it leaks metadata that is valuable in multi-tenant or shared virtual-host environments where operational visibility itself is a boundary concern. An attacker with a low-privilege account can map the topology of every vhost, identify high-value queues by name or message rate, and gather the intelligence needed for targeted follow-on activity without triggering permission errors. Both issues were introduced when OAuth support expanded in early 2024 and were fixed in the coordinated releases 4.3.0, 4.2.6, 4.1.11, 4.0.20, and 3.13.15. The patch removes the obsolete /api/auth endpoint entirely; OAuth settings now flow only through the authenticated bootstrap.js path. Common identity providers named in the disclosure include Auth0, Microsoft Entra ID, Keycloak, and UAA. Miggo notes that RabbitMQ sees roughly fifteen million downloads per year and runs in approximately eight percent of containers according to industry census data. At the time of disclosure there was no evidence of in-the-wild exploitation of these specific flaws.
Post summary
The text discloses detailed vulnerability information for two RabbitMQ CVEs, outlines exploitation steps, affected versions, and includes patch releases, while noting no current in‑the‑wild exploitation.


