
Claude Code, Cursor, and Codex CVE-2026-19592 all got caught running attacker code before you ever see a trust prompt. Manifold Security found 8 of these flaws across 7 command-line coding agents: Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, Goose, Hermes Agent, Qwen Code, Grok Build. Same root cause every time. The bug lives in core.fsmonitor, a Git perf setting that names a command Git runs to check which files changed. Git reads that value straight from the repo's own.git/config. Any index refresh triggers it: git status, git diff, the branch check your agent runs silently on startup. On Claude Code and Hermes Agent, the payload fires before the workspace-trust prompt even shows up. On Qwen Code, before you've authenticated. On Grok Build, on the first keystroke. No prompt to the model. No tool approval. Just opening the folder is enough. Exploitation needs the.git folder intact: a shared drive, a synced folder, a USB stick, a zip a contractor sent you. A normal git clone strips this. But how many repos do you actually clone vs just copy from a client's shared drive? goose got CVSS 7.0 (CVE-2026-72718), fixed in 1.44.0. Claude Code patched the core.fsmonitor path in 2.1.196, but a second path through claude ultrareview was still live on 2.1.252 as of Sep 1. Codex CLI fixed in 0.131.0, covered by CVE-2026-19592. Hermes Agent, Qwen Code, Grok Build: still unpatched at publication. BEFORE (dangerous): agent runs git status/diff at session start to figure out branch and changes, before any trust decision, blindly trusting whatever the repo's.git/config says to run. AFTER (safe): sandbox every git subprocess call, strip or validate repo-supplied config keys (core.fsmonitor, hooks) before the first invocation, gate ANY git command behind the workspace-trust decision, not just tool calls. Building agents that touch untrusted repos? Go check which git commands yours fires before the user approves anything. Would you even notice if your CLI agent ran a command before you saw a trust prompt? #AISecurity #PromptInjection #SupplyChainSecurity
Post summary
The post reveals multiple CVE‑2026‑xxxx bugs in command‑line coding agents that allow attacker code to run via Git’s core.fsmonitor before user trust decisions, provides technical exploitation details, patch notes, and overall exposes the vulnerability.





