NVD description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-tcp: reject a read that transferred too few bytes
nvme_tcp_recv_data() completes a request once the current C2HData PDU
has been consumed. Nothing compares the total bytes received against
the length the command asked for: struct nvme_tcp_request has no
receive-side counter, queue->data_remaining is per queue, and
blk_mq_end_request() completes for blk_rq_bytes(rq) unconditionally
with no residual concept anywhere above.
A controller can therefore answer a 4096-byte read with 512 bytes and
have it reported as a complete read; user space then gets 4096 bytes of
which 3584 are whatever was already in the page. I reproduced that with
a test target.
Count the bytes received and refuse to complete a successful read whose
count does not match, at the two NVME_TCP_F_DATA_SUCCESS paths and in
nvme_tcp_process_nvme_cqe(). The success test shifts req->status right
by one, because the driver keeps the wire value there and shifts it on
completion, so the check must see what the completion path will see.
Only REQ_OP_READ is checked, because there the length comes from the
sectors the request covers; a passthrough command is built by its
submitter, which picks both command and buffer, so the kernel has
nothing to compare against.
