CVE-2026-63978Patch

LOWCVSS 9.8 · CRITICAL

Signal is active with 1 mentions in latest observed window

Immediate actions

  • Patch affected systems immediately

Recommended action window: Monitor and triage in normal cycle

NVD description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: Drain pending requests at net namespace exit The arguments to list_splice_init() in handshake_net_exit() are reversed. The call moves the local empty "requests" list onto hn->hn_requests, leaving the local list empty, so the subsequent drain loop runs zero iterations. Pending handshake requests that had not yet been accepted are not torn down when the net namespace is destroyed; each one keeps a reference on a socket file and on the handshake_req allocation. Pass the source and destination in the documented order (list_splice_init(list, head) moves list onto head) so the pending list is transferred to the local scratch list and drained through handshake_complete(). Fixing the splice direction exposes a list-corruption race. After the splice each req->hr_list still has non-empty link pointers, threading the stack-local scratch list rather than hn_requests. A concurrent handshake_req_cancel() -- for example, from sunrpc's TLS timeout on a kernel socket whose netns reference was not taken -- finds the request through the rhashtable, calls remove_pending(), and sees !list_empty(&req->hr_list). __remove_pending_locked() then list_del_init()s an entry off the scratch list while the drain iterates, corrupting it. The same call arriving after the drain loop has run list_del() on an entry hits LIST_POISON instead. Have remove_pending() check HANDSHAKE_F_NET_DRAINING under hn_lock and report not-found when drain is in progress. The drain has already taken ownership; handshake_complete()'s existing test_and_set on HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED still arbitrates between drain and cancel for who calls the consumer's hp_done. Use list_del_init() rather than list_del() in the drain so req->hr_list does not carry LIST_POISON after drain releases the entry. The DRAINING guard in remove_pending() makes cancel return false, but cancel still falls through to test_and_set_bit on HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED and drops the request's hr_file reference. Without another pin, if that is the last reference, sk_destruct frees the request while it is still linked on the drain loop's local list. Pin each request's hr_file under hn_lock before releasing the list, and drop that drain pin after the loop finishes with the request.

0.5/ 10 priority

Sources & remediation

Weakness type (CWE)
CWE-362

Priority

LOW

Exploitation

NONE

PoC

NONE

Patch

AVAILABLE

Momentum

NONE

Threat summary

  • Patch or workaround signal is available
  • 1 mentions across 1 observed day

What's happening

  • Patch or workaround mentioned in 1 signal
  • Technical details provided in 1 signal
  • 1 total mentions across 1 day

Deep dive

Activity timeline1 mentions / 1d
00111Mentions · 2026-07-21: 1Patch / Workaround · 2026-07-21: 1Technical Details · 2026-07-21: 107-21
Signal classification1 categories
Patch
1100.0%
Referenced assets1 URL
Full discourse1 post
  • Windows Forum@windowsforum
    Patch

    🔒 A “small cleanup bug” in Linux’s namespace TLS handling became a full concurrency nightmare: dangling requests, broken cancellation, and teardown races. Kernel maintenance: where housekeeping bites back. https://windowsforum.com/threads/cve-2026-63978-fix-critical-linux-kernel-namespace-tls-race.439809/?utm_source=x&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=news_node84 #ContainerSecurity #LinuxKernelSecurity https://t.co/6YNln3H6nE

    Post summary

    The thread explains a race condition bug in Linux’s namespace TLS handling and notes that a fix/patch is available.

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    1.3K followersView on X

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